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“As for the United States' future in Afghanistan, it will be fire and 
hell and total defeat, God willing, as it was for their predecessors - 
the Soviets and, before them, the British. Afghans have a history of 































In October 2011, the war in Afghanistan reached its ignominious ten year anniversary. As the 
conflict rolls on relentlessly, observers from across all disciplines, and indeed the general public 
themselves, have attempted to identify why the intervention, which began as Operation Enduring 
Freedom, has instead become an ‘Enduring Nightmare’. The following dissertation attempts to 
provide empirical reasoning to this question by means of a literature review of the established 
strategic critiques of the intervention between the years of October 2001 and October 2008. 
Through this methodological approach this dissertation hypothesises that the failings behind the 
intervention into Afghanistan stem from a fundamental inconsistency of the strategic design by 
which inadequate strategic ‘means’ were employed to meet unachievable strategic ‘ends’. As such, 
the intervention in Afghanistan from October 2001 to October 2008 will serve as a valuable 
lesson of the West’s inability to apply a strategic model to accomplish successful policy outcomes 
















    When Jordan West heard about the events of September 11th 2001 he was sitting in a 
mathematics class in his Yorkshire primary school propelling paper aeroplanes across the room 
to the frustration of his teacher. Jordan was then nine years old, lived over three thousand miles 
away from New York City and had never even heard of Afghanistan.1 However in April 2011 
Rifleman Jordan West became the youngest member of a British infantry platoon deployed to 
Afghanistan to take part in a conflict that began before Jordan considered ‘war’ as anything other 
than a playground amusement. Operation Enduring Freedom, which began in Afghanistan in 
October 2001, has now surpassed its inauspicious 10 year anniversary. Few will be inclined to 
celebrate. 
   Despite a decade’s worth of endeavours to counter terrorism, eliminate insurgency and create 
stability, Afghanistan remains a war zone. The writ of the corrupt Afghan government is in a 
state of abeyance while aid efforts have failed to hoist the people of Afghanistan from poverty 
and destitution. Perhaps most notably, Islamic terrorism, which catalysed the intervention in the 
first place, remains as credible a threat as it was on the eve of September 10th. For these reasons, 
soldiers like Jordan West are still being asked to risk their lives in the perilous terrain of 
Afghanistan. For the U.S. and her allies, Operation Enduring Freedom has instead become an 
‘Enduring Nightmare’.  
 
Statement of Purpose 
 
   As the conflict rolls on remorselessly, critics of the intervention strategy in Afghanistan have 
been numerous and at times scathing. This dissertation seeks to identify the various strategic 
critiques of the intervention in Afghanistan between October 2001 and October 2008.  
   Although this dissertation stops its analysis at this juncture, the reader is all too aware that the 
conflict in Afghanistan is still active. The reasoning behind the decision to confine the margins of 
analysis to a specific period is to establish how strategic failures between 2001 and 2008 enabled 
the conflict to become protracted prior to the current state of affairs. Even though a 
multidimensional conflict that stretches over a decade is invariably of a polymorphous 
disposition, during this analysis three palpable strategic phases to the conflict are noted. The first 
strategic phase involved the invasion and overthrow of the Taliban government in the aftermath 
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of 9/11. The second phase refers to the nation-building agenda in Afghanistan during which the 
strategic priority became Iraq. For convenience sake we identify this period as formally coming 
into being after President Bush’s State of the Union Address in January 2003. The transformation 
from the second to the third, and also the current phase, is defined by the elevation of 
Afghanistan to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. In practice this was symbolised by the 
promotion of General David Patraeus to CENTCOM on October 31st 2008 after previously 
commanding Multi-National Force in Iraq.2  
   Although analysis of the current strategic phase has stimulated rigorous debate among 
commentators, this dissertation assumes hindsight enables a stronger foundation for empirical 
type research.  Given that the full implications of this phase of the strategy are yet to be realised, 
a conclusive critique is neither possible nor appropriate. Consequently this analysis elects to focus 
exclusively on strategy that has come to pass. Nevertheless, by identifying the major strategic 
critiques of the intervention over the period between October 2001 and October 2008, it 
becomes clear how strategic failings have contributed to Afghanistan becoming the current 
intractable beast of burden for the U.S. and her allies.3 
 
 ‘Strategy’ as a Concept   
 
   For the purpose of this dissertation the broad definition of ‘strategy’ offered by Mackubin 
Thomas Owens is more than sufficient: “Strategy describes the way in which the available means will be 
employed to achieve the ends of policy”.4 Even though this definition is straightforward enough, the 
components of strategy are conceptually more complex. Contrary to classical interpretations, 
strategy is no longer restricted to the military domain and now incorporates many non-military 
processes. Economic, political and social means may be employed in the pursuit of strategic 
objectives. Additionally, strategy is no longer considered to be limited to the single level of 
operational analysis. While there is debate over the various ‘realms’ of strategic study, this 
dissertation assumes that the broad notion of ‘strategy’ has three levels. 
   At the highest level is the conception of a ‘grand strategy’. According to one definition ‘grand 
strategy’ refers to the integration of “military, political, and economic means to pursue states' ultimate 
                                                 
2 CENTCOM refers to the United States Military Central Command. 
3 For the sake of convenience throughout the rest of this dissertation the United States and her allies will be referred 
to as the ‘Coalition’. Since 9/11 the term ‘Coalition’ has been used as a collective reference to multiple nations who 
conducted joint military action in Afghanistan. Although explicit interests may differ among Coalition partners, for 
the most part the Coalition in Afghanistan shares broad mutual strategic objectives.   
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objectives in the international system”.5 In this sense ‘grand strategy’ is a reference to the overarching 
interests and objectives - national policy. In the context of the intervention in Afghanistan, the 
‘grand strategy’ refers to the broad security of the United States and her Coalition partners.  
   The second realm of strategy, and the principal level of analysis for this dissertation, can be 
described as ‘operational strategy’. Operational strategy refers to the planning, implementation 
and other constituent means by which an operation is designed to achieve the objectives of the 
‘grand strategy’.6 In the case of this dissertation, the operational strategy refers to the 
implementation of the intervention in the theatre of Afghanistan.  
   The final realm of strategy is the tactical level. This refers to the tools which are employed 
during the actualisation of ‘operational strategy’; the stage where strategic theory engages with 
reality in practice.7 Tactics broadly refer to anything from a unit’s decision to call in air support to 
the chosen tone in a diplomat’s voice when he addresses a counterpart. Together these three 
levels of strategy are interlinked they form part of an organic whole which links national policy to 




   The methodological approach of this dissertation takes the style of a literature survey based on 
the established criticisms of intervention in Afghanistan. This approach will enable the reader to 
identify the key strategic issues facing military intervention in Afghanistan from October 2001 to 
October 2008. More generally it will reveal the significance behind the strategic art of enabling 
realistic ‘means’ to meet achievable ‘ends’ and, perhaps more significantly, the perilous 
consequences of neglecting this fundamental notion of strategic thinking.  
   Our sources vary from politicians at the highest level of the policy making process to 
academics, journalists and professional observers on the ground. Although this implies 
considerable diversity of sources, the literature reviewed all aspires to provide reliable knowledge 
on the intervention in Afghanistan which can be used for the purpose of strategic assessment. 
Logically, because of the critical analytical nature of this dissertation, the bulk of material comes 
from the academic community and journalists. As the conflict in Afghanistan is still operational 
there is a large amount of material, frequently emotive, which includes personal histories, 
interviews and pressure group publications. This type of material is excluded from this 
                                                 
5 Stephen D. Biddle, ‘American Grand Strategy after 9/11: An Assessment’, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2005), p.v. 
6 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp.31-38. 
7 J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., ‘A Survey of the Theory of Strategy’, in Theory of War and Strategy, ed. by J. Boone 
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dissertation because it is not inherently strategic in nature and may be considered subjective or 
unreliable.  
   Nevertheless the remaining pool of information that fits into this methodological criterion is 
vast. As such, this dissertation is focused on the case of Afghanistan and cannot expand on 
‘grand strategic’ critiques that are not directly associated with the intervention itself. Additionally, 
a complete critique that covers all the possible dynamics at the tactical level of analysis would be 
an enormous task and warrants a far more substantial study than there is space for here. For 
these reasons the bulk of this dissertation’s analysis is related to the operational level. 
Additionally, although this paper identifies the key strategic issues at the operational level it does 
not seek to cover all the nuanced factors at work and, as a consequence, a more complete analysis 





   In compliance with the methodological approach to this dissertation, this dissertation is 
structured periodically. As an essential prologue to a strategic assessment in any given campaign, 
Chapter 1 considers the geography, politics and social landscape of Afghanistan. In order to 
connect strategic theory to practice, Chapter 1 also contains a history of Afghanistan with 
particular reference to past interventions.  
   Equipped with an understanding of Afghanistan’s strategic context, in Chapter 2 this 
dissertation embarks on a study of the first strategic phase of the current intervention. This 
chapter is entitled ‘Now the Taliban will pay a price’; 8 a quote from President Bush in the 
aftermath of 9/11 after launching the intervention into Afghanistan with the strategic objectives 
of overthrowing the Taliban regime and bringing al Qaeda to justice.   
   In Chapter 3, entitled ‘Steadfast in our process, now we press on’,9 we investigate the strategy 
employed after the Taliban regime collapsed, nation-building had commenced and the grand 
strategy had shifted towards Iraq and the wider ‘War on Terror’. The strategic objective under 
scrutiny in this chapter is the recognised ‘modus operandi’ of nation-building operations - 
political development, capitalisation on security and social development. 
                                                 
8
 George Bush, comment on “President Bush Launches Attack on Afghanistan”, About.com: Middle East Issues (2001), 
<http://middleeast.about.com/od/afghanistan/qt/me081007b.htm> [accessed 10 March 2010]. 
9
 George Bush, comment on “Bush State of the Union Address”, CNN (29 January 2002) 
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   After identifying the principal strategic critiques from these two phases, the conclusion 
summarises the central themes to this dissertation while identifying what the established critiques 
reveal about strategy in the modern world and the contribution of strategic critiques in general. In 
doing so, this dissertation aspires to provide some strategic reasoning as to why the intervention 
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Chapter 1 
Background to the Intervention in Afghanistan 
 
   In both the planning of strategy and its analysis, the methodology often begins with referral to 
a map, accompanied by a revision of the history books. While politics and policy alters and shifts, 
geography is a constant and inflexible variable. Because of this characteristic, regardless of the 
numerous strategies and tactics employed in an intervention, the implications of geography are 
frequently found to be the defining factor. In Afghanistan, as with many recurring conflict prone 
territories, history has routinely confirmed this reality.  
   For these reasons, this background overview is required to contextualise the intervention 
strategy within the strategic environment in which it was implemented. The focus of this chapter 
is on the country’s natural and human geography as well as a reference to more recent past 
conflicts. By beginning with this essential methodological process, the strategy of intervention 
can be considered alongside the constant variables that have unsparingly defined Afghanistan.   
 
The Natural Geography of Afghanistan 
 
   Afghanistan is an entirely landlocked country of mostly mountainous terrain contrasted with 
vast plains in the north and south-west. It borders with Pakistan to the south-east, Iran to the 
west and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and China to the north. The climate is arid to 
semi-arid which plays host to extreme weather conditions, with cold winters and fervently hot 
and dry summers. The terrain is rugged and vegetation is sparse. The summer months bring 
droughts, intense humidity, dust, sandstorms and whirlwinds, whilst the winter periods feature 
freezing temperatures, surprise rainstorms, floods, and snow traps in the mountainous regions.10 
These natural environmental and geographical characteristics ensure that Afghanistan is a 
desperately inhospitable climate for human existence, let alone combat operations.11 
   There are a number of strategic implications to be drawn from this data. Firstly, the sheer size 
of Afghanistan and the lay of the land places increased strain on the logistics aspect of any 
                                                 
10 Peter R. Blood ed., Afghanistan: A Country Study, (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 2001), 
<http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/> [accessed 5 February 2010]. 
11 Other major military interventions involving the U.S. or NATO forces since 1990 include; Iraq 1991, Somalia 
1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1994, Haiti 1994, Rwanda 1994, Kosovo 1999, East Timor 1999 and Sierra Leone 
2000. This list is far from exhaustive, however it reveals how Afghanistan was one of the largest countries (excluding 
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military activity.12 The mountains provide an obstinate physical barrier limiting access to only a 
few roads and passes, of which the great majority are untracked or have been decimated through 
years of conflict. Restricted choice of road access leaves convoys open to the risk of ambush or 
disruption which is reinforced by the high ground flanking the passes on either side. These 
overstretched logistics lines, running through a lethal environment, led the Duke of Wellington to 
claim “a small army would be annihilated and a large one starved”.13 Although modern technology has 
mitigated some of these challenges since Wellington’s day, the issue is still relevant with NATO 
itself acknowledging that logistics are severely “hampered by rough terrain, unpaved roads and security 
threats”.14 Even a military equipped the most advanced logistical capacity ever witnessed is 
significantly challenged by the contours of Afghanistan’s imposing terrain.  
   Secondly, the extreme climate and variable seasons have noteworthy implications on the 
conditions for operations. During winter the harsh temperatures have traditionally made combat 
operations impossible. In spring, as fighting comes out of hibernation, the balance of power is 
reset and tangible gains that were made during the preceding fighting season become null and 
void. The conditions for combat troops are far from comfortable. Vicious winds, soaring 
temperatures and uncomfortably dry conditions necessitate robust levels of technical and human 
endurance. This factor is further aggravated by the fact that that the West’s conventional military 
hardware was originally designed to face the Soviet threat in the cool and temperate conditions of 
Eastern Europe, not the semiarid climate of Afghanistan.15 Facing these conditions, one of the 
main staff considerations for the current NATO force in Afghanistan is the ongoing need for 
frequent re-supplies of equipment, spare parts and provisions.16 In essence, the Afghan climate 
provide a formidable adversary to even the most technologically advanced militaries.  
   Thirdly, the geographical topography with its mountainous terrain is far from inviting to large 
scale military equipment, in particular armoured transport and heavy assault weaponry. This 
creates problems for armies reliant on such equipment for battlefield operations. A premise for 
strategists is that “to decide to attack is to commit to movement”.17 Yet conventional militaries have their 
mobility seriously impeded by Afghanistan’s geography. With an isolated and ambush-prone 
                                                 
12 Afghanistan is the 41st largest country in the world and around the same size as the State of Texas. 'Afghanistan', 
CIA World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html> [accessed 1 
October 2010]. 
13 The Duke of Wellington comment in; John Sweeney, ‘The killing fields’ New Statesman (23 October 2008) 
<http://www.newstatesman.com/books/2008/10/afghanistan-british-taliban> [accessed 12 September 2010].    
14 NATO, 'Backgrounder: Logistics support for NATO operations: 7. Logistics for Afghanistan', NATO On-Line 
Library, (2006) < http://www.nato.int/docu/logistics/html_en/logistics07.html> [accessed 23 October 2010].  
15 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 2006), pp.298-299. 
16 Lieutenant Michael C. T. Roberts, in discussion with author, 20 August 2010. 
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environment, Afghanistan becomes entirely unsuitable to bovine moving and closely massed 
conventional equipment, reversing the initiative of attack in favour of highly mobile forces.   
   With precipitous contours that cover vast areas and a hostile and arduous climate, this 
preliminary geographical overview plainly reveals how the conditions in Afghanistan are totally 
unforgiving to large scale operations with conventionally and technically structured militaries. 
Conversely, in operational terms Afghanistan’s geography is far more favourable to light and 
mobile forces who can exploit the mountain passes and valleys as though it were a playground 
for escape and evasion operations. Because of this, Afghanistan’s geo-operational environment is 
a daunting theatre of operations, and one that even modern military technology has yet to equal. 
 
The Human Geography of Afghanistan 
 
   Unfortunately for interventionists, the harsh and unforgiving landscape of Afghanistan is 
supplemented by an equally truculent and complex human geography. The presence of Islam 
transcends all aspects of life, thereby contributing to a highly traditional religious society.18 A 
crude population breakdown of Afghanistan will reveal a total of 55 different ethnic entities and 
tribes, speaking a total of 45 languages.19 The agglomeration of variable identities has 
manufactured bitter and lasting rivalries.20 As a result, the relations among ethnic groups have 
traditionally been one of conflict and have played a major part in Afghanistan’s troubled social 
history.21  
   Just as inter-group tribal fracas has characterised Afghan society throughout the ages, so it has 
also formed the basis of a hugely unstable political structure. Throughout the 20th century, every 
one of Afghanistan’s political rulers has been forcibly deposed or murdered. The political fabric 
of the country is symbolised by an enduring contest for control between local entities, 
complicated by interference from regional actors in neighbouring countries, and in some cases, 
from major international powers.  
   While political systems and elites have come and gone, authoritarianism has never been far 
from the core of political activity. Despite this, effective political control of the Afghan 
peripheries has rarely been exercised by a centralised authority. Any influence of central 
                                                 
18 Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2006), p.235. 
19 'Afghanistan', CIA World Factbook. 
20
 Nigel J. R. Allan, ‘Defining Place and People in Afghanistan’, Post Soviet Geography and Economics 42:8 (2001), 
pp.552-556. 
21 For a comprehensive history on Afghanistan see; Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History (London: I.B. 
Tauris and Co, 2005). For a history of Afghanistan that focuses on the military conflicts of the country see: Stephen 
Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 
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government has been restricted to the urban minority, while the bulk of the population live in 
isolated rural areas, mostly free from the writ of central government.22  
    The consequence of this is a highly localised and fractured society corroded by years of inter-
group conflict. Political authority is to be found in the countryside, far away from Kabul. Local 
powerbrokers gain their authority through behaviour patterns that best resemble what observers 
would describe as ‘warlordism’.23 The inter-relations between warlords is characterised by a “part 
feudal part democratic ethos”24 which abides by a strict code of honour that has no basis in formal 
written law. Rivalry and competition between the ethnic groups, warlords and tribes has been 
persistent since the creation of the state of Afghanistan in 1880 and this localised enmity remains 
to this day.25 
   Combined with these tough social and political conditions - as well as the environmental 
challenges outlined in the preceding section - development in Afghanistan has effectively 
remained dormant. Only 12.3 percent of the land is considered arable and only 23,860 square 
kilometres of this territory is irrigated.26 Industry is limited to the small scale manufacturing of 
basic handmade goods, whilst there is a very small production and extraction of natural 
resources. The country’s principal export product is opium, which is internationally trafficked 
into the illegal narcotics industry. Reliable economic indicators before the intervention are hard 
to come by, however estimates suggest unemployment was as high as 40 percent and the per 
capita GDP was a meagre US$130.80.27  
   For basic necessities, Afghanistan relies on ongoing external support, of which a large amount 
comes in the form of aid. Yet, despite the exertions of aid agencies, Afghanistan remains an 
undeveloped and impoverished country with the majority of the population illiterate, and with 
one of the world’s worst life expectancy rates at a startlingly low 43 years.28 This is worsened by 
the wide dispersion of populations that make accessing communities difficult and implementing 
development strategies challenging.  
                                                 
22 For a comprehensive socio-political overview of Afghanistan see: Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil 
War (New Jersey: Princeton Books, 1995). 
23 The term ‘warlordism’ is hotly debated. In this study the term warlord is borrowed from Mackinlay and refers to 
“the leader of an armed band, possibly numbering up to several thousand fighters, who can hold territory locally and at the same time act 
financially and politically in the international system without interference from the state in which he is based”, from John Mackinlay, 
‘Defining Warlords’ in Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium, (Institute for Security Studies, 2000), 
pp.48-62, (p.48).  
24 Major Andrew M. Roe, ' British Governance of the North-West Frontier (1919 to 1947): A Blueprint for 
Contemporary Afghanistan?' (Unpublished masters thesis, U.S Army Command and General Staff College, 2005), 
p.21.  
25 Allan, ‘Defining Place and People in Afghanistan’, p.552. 
26 George Kruys, ‘Post-Cold War/11 September 2001 Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency with specific reference to 
Iraq and Afghanistan’, Institute for Strategic Studies, (2005), p.53. 
27 'Afghanistan', UN Data, <http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx> [accessed 3 October 2010]. 
28 Rex Brynen, 'Donor Assistance: Lessons from Palestine for Afghanistan', in Postconflict Development: Meeting New 
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   This brief sketch of Afghanistan’s human geography has several strategic implications. The first 
and most obvious of these is related to the fractured and conflict prone social composition of the 
country. Even before adding another belligerent by means of external intervention, Afghanistan 
is categorically brimming with antagonists. The disputes between these groups are long standing 
and rooted in such complex sociological issues as ethnicity and tribal enmity. As a result, 
multifaceted conflict has become an omnipresent variable in Afghan society. Furthermore, as a 
consequence of enduring conflict, massive population displacement has regionalised many of 
these issues, ensuring that the grievances and consequences of the Afghan conflict are exported 
to a demographic beyond its borders.     
   Secondly, if the categorisation of a ‘failing state’ is ever justified, Afghanistan would be the 
primary candidate. The country’s political structure meets the very definition of ‘weak 
governance’. Society is entirely traditional and shows little evidence of ideological modernisation. 
Additionally, the dire socio-economic condition of the country and a consistent lack of progress 
caused by enduring conflict have allowed Afghanistan’s infrastructural development to regress. 
This perpetual lack of progress has led some politicians to claim that Afghanistan is a “broken 
13th-century country”;29 much to the outrage of Afghan officials. Yet research actually suggests that 
the comparison is unduly complementary to Afghanistan, with relative per capita incomes of 
England in the latter Middle Ages being significantly higher than those in modern day 
Afghanistan.30 
   Thirdly, because the population, economy, and political structure are almost entirely locally 
determined and unofficial, in terms of intervention, it is difficult to identify the key power 
structures that are strategically essential to control. Furthermore, because of the diffused 
remoteness of population groups, security forces must be widely spread and isolated in order to 
provide a viable security presence. By definition, this requires a high volume of troops to cover 
the extensive terrain and maintain effective logistics lines. Alongside Afghanistan’s imposing 
natural geography, this is an intimidating prospect. 
   Understanding these human geographical determinants is critical to any strategic assessment of 
Afghanistan. Such an investigation reveals a traditional, fractured, deprived and conflict-prone 
society. When combined with the natural geography of the country, these implications provide an 
exceptionally challenging geographical context to any intervention.   
                                                 
29 Liam Fox, comment in ‘Liam Fox: Afghanistan is a broken 13th-century country’, New Statesman (24 May 2010) 
<http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2010/05/13th-century-fox-afghanistan> [accessed 10 June 
2010]. 
30 ‘Researchers: Medieval England Better Off Than Modern-Day Afghanistan’, National Public Radio (7 December 
2010) < http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/12/07/131883758/researchers-medieval-england-better-off-










  14 
 
Thirty Years of War – The Political Context of Afghanistan 
 
   Despite the disincentives for intervention, Afghanistan has long been subject to external 
interference. It is the country’s ill-fated location as the crossroads to the subcontinent, 
surrounded by a tense regional geo-political environment that places it within a strategic 
cauldron.  
   Pakistan’s long-term interests in Afghanistan arise from a fear of geographical encirclement by 
India and the necessity for strategic defence in depth. Conversely for India, the prospect of an 
ally in Afghanistan affords the opportunity to apply pressure on Pakistan from a second front. 
For Russia, Afghanistan is the principal buttress against the threat of militant Islamic nationalism 
that continues to fester unpleasantly in Chechnya. Iran has established commercial interests in 
Afghanistan and with 1.7 million opiate addicts, has long suffered the misfortune of being the 
first stop on the narcotics trade routes.31 For each of these countries, Afghanistan serves both as 
a threat and as a point of strategic opportunity. For many years each of these regional actors has 
maintained an active and frequently intrusive interest in Afghanistan. These interests, ever 
adapting yet never lessening, show how failure to consider Afghanistan’s wider regional 
perspective is failure to understand Afghanistan at all. 
   Alongside this, historically Afghanistan has found itself at the centre of wider international 
relations concerning superpowers and imperialists alike. In each case, Afghanistan has hosted 
some of history’s most illustrious militaries and tested them to breaking point. While Alexander 
the Great managed to conquer Iran in only six months, it took him three years to suppress the 
area which is now Afghanistan. Louis Dupree writes that Afghanistan changed Alexander’s 
campaigns definitively: “From that time until he departed the Central Asia steppes, Alexander knew no 
peace…more wounds, more deserts, more thirst, more mountains, then Babylon, then death”.32 It was a cruel 
experience for Alexander’s army. His soldiers battled the cold conditions and arduous terrain 
while being hounded by merciless Afghan resistance. 
   Over 2,000 years later in the long running dispute between Britain and Russia, famously termed 
‘The Great Game’, the British Army was drawn into Afghanistan for fear that Russia might use 
the country as a springboard for attacks into India. However the Afghan population proved 
highly objectionable to the foreign invaders and set about the task of purging the country of the 
British. With roads that carved their way through mountainous bandit country, the British 
                                                 
31 Greg Bruno and Lionel Beehner, 'Iran and the Future of Afghanistan', Council on Foreign Relations (2009), 
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/13578/> [accessed 19 August 2010]. 
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struggled to maintain their logistics lines while isolated garrisons suffered heavily under sustained 
attacks from local forces.33 Unable to trust local proxies, the political efforts to implicate a 
strategy of ‘divide and rule’ proved ineffective.34 An attempt to centralise authority by replacing 
the Afghan Emir with a British proxy only served to aggravate the population further.35 
Following a revolt in 1841, the British realised they were unable to maintain a foothold in 
Afghanistan and were forced to withdraw from Kabul. With a party of 16,500 soldiers and 
civilians, only one individual made it safely to Jalalabad while the remainder were put to the 
sword.36 The Afghan warriors had demonstrated a remarkable capacity to outlast their opponent 
in warfare and as a result the British had been forced to sheepishly withdraw behind the Durand 
line.37  
   Nowhere in Afghanistan’s modern history has the anti-colonial resilience of the Afghan people 
been epitomised so plainly as with the Soviet intervention of 1979.38 At the height of Cold War 
tensions, the invasion roused the U.S. into action. Local Afghan arriors, known as the 
Mujahidin,39 were sponsored by Washington to embark on a ‘jihad’40 of attrition against the 
Soviet invaders. The Mujahidin adopted classic anti-colonial guerrilla tactics by orchestrating 
multiple small scale attacks which chipped away at Soviet morale. The well equipped Soviet 
troops had virtually no guerrilla training and subsequently experienced high casualties and failed 
to establish stability. The Soviet military, which comprised heavy armoured vehicles, were “against 
small highly mobile units [and] very little could be accomplished with the help of modern military technology”.41 As 
Anatoly Chernyaev, aide to Mikhail Gorbachev, writing in 1987 despaired, “We suffered such heavy 
losses! And what for?”42 It proved a disastrous venture. By the time the Soviets eventually withdrew 
                                                 
33 Field-Marshall Earl Roberts of Kandahar, Forty-One Years in India (London: MacMillan and Co, 1905), pp.349-377. 
34 Ibid, pp.429-439. 
35 Milton Bearden, ‘Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires’, Foreign Affairs 80:6 (2001), p.18. 
36 Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould, Invisible History: Afghanistan’s Untold Story (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 
2009), p.34. 
37 For a complete historical overview of conflict in Afghanistan see; Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: a military history from 
Alexander the Great to the war against the Taliban (Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 2009). 
38 For a complete analysis of the intervention from both a tactical and strategic perspective see Edward B. 
Westerman, The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Bear Versus the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, 1979-1989, (Thesis presented to 
the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, 1997). 
39 The term ‘Mujahidin’ literally translates to ‘strugglers’. The term became widely used as a reference to Muslim 
fighters who fought against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.  
40 The literal translation of ‘Jihad’ into English is ‘struggle’. Jihad is frequently referenced in the Qur’an and although 
a wide range of opinions exist as to its exact meaning in this context it refers to ‘religious war’.  
41 Alexander Lyakhovsky, ‘Appendix 8’, Tragedy and Valour of Afghan, trans. by Svetlana Savranskaya (Moscow: Iskon, 
1995) <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/r21.doc> [accessed 20 March 2010]. 
42 ‘Anatoly Chernyaev’s notes from Politburo Sessions’, Communist Party of the Soviet Union – Central Committee, (23 and 
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in 1989, the campaign had been hugely costly with just around 15 thousand fatalities and at a 
financial cost of around 5 billion Rubles a year.43  
   It was this repetitious history of failed foreign interventions that led British Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan to declare that the first rule of politics was “never invade Afghanistan”.44 As a 
simple reading of history reveals, by nature of its strategic location, intervention in Afghanistan is 
never without a more complex regional dimension. Most importantly, the operational challenges 
facing intervention are so significant that no foreign power has occupied Afghanistan without 
immense hardship and eventual withdrawal.  
*** 
 
                                                 
43 Lester W. Grau ed. and trans., The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat and Tactics in Afghanistan (Washington: 
National Defense University Press, 1996), p.xiv. 
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Chapter 2 
October 2001 – January 2003 
‘Now the Taliban will pay a price’ 45 
 
   The outrage that manifested itself after the events of September 11th necessitated the Bush 
administration to undertake definitive action which, in the first instance, would lead to the most 
recent intervention into Afghanistan. This Chapter analyses the first strategic phase of the 
intervention involving the counterattack into Afghanistan with the dual objectives of bringing al 
Qaeda to justice and overthrowing the Taliban regime which had harboured them.46  
 
Strategic Objectives - October 2001 
 
   In order to understand the strategic objectives of the U.S. on the eve of the intervention, it is 
essential to consider the cognitive implications of the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. consciousness. 
Even though some experts had long feared a large scale attack on American soil, few within the 
administration or the intelligence services predicted anything as cataclysmic and spectacular as 
passenger jets colliding into populated buildings.47 The experience instilled in Americans a level 
of existential insecurity that has not existed since the Cold War. Yet in many senses the new 
threat was even more terrifying. Whereas the principle of mutually assured destruction had 
previously ensured a basic level of stability, non-state terrorists who craved martyrdom were 
hardly an enemy that could be deterred by the prospect of nuclear holocaust. Furthermore, as 
demonstrated by al Qaeda's dramatic exploits, the capacity for carnage on a massive scale and the 
relatively unsophisticated means by which terrorists could achieve this meant that that the 
language of self defence, stipulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter, had been rendered almost 
meaningless.48 Shaken by this ‘new’ threat, and with the determination to categorically avoid 
another 9/11, the response issued from the White House on October 7th 2001 was an 
unwavering "campaign against terrorism".49  
   What followed was a dramatic shift in foreign policy. The soft isolationist approach that the 
Bush administration had pledged during the 2000 election campaign was substituted for a strategy 
                                                 
45 Bush, comment on “President Bush Launches Attack on Afghanistan”. 
46 For a concise history of the Taliban see; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central 
Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).  
47 Director of CIA Counter Terrorism Centre J. Cofer Black was quoted as saying, “We are going to be struck soon…many 
Americans are going to die, and it could be in the U.S.” Cofer Black quoted in Steven Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of 
the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (London: Penguin Group, 2005), p.569.  
48 ‘Article 51’, The United Nations Charter, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml> [accessed 10 
March 2010]. 
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that was as proactive as it was uncompromising.50 Under the assumption that ‘attack is the best 
form of defence’, the campaign against terrorism did not just involve tightening homeland 
security but necessitated campaigns overseas by “bringing the war to the bad guys”.51 First and 
foremost on the agenda were the al Qaeda terrorists who had made Afghanistan their home. 
Speaking from the White House treaty room, Bush authorised “sustained, comprehensive and relentless 
operations to drive [al Qaeda] out and bring them to justice”.52 By protecting the terrorists and continually 
failing to hand over bin Laden to the U.S., the Taliban regime had incriminated themselves by 
association. Punishment would not be a half-hearted affair; Bush made it clear that the objective 
in Afghanistan was ‘regime removal’ as the "United States would punish not just the perpetrators of the 
attack, but also those who harboured them".53 With the aim of overthrowing the Taliban regime and 
hunting out al Qaeda, the basic two strategic objectives for intervention in Afghanistan had been 
set.  
   Yet the premise behind the decision to topple the Taliban 'regime' demonstrated a fundamental 
component contained in the U.S. grand strategy in the wake of 9/11. The ‘War on Terror’ did 
not exclusively target terrorists but also any nation-state or regime which harboured terroristic 
activities: 
“Today we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broader. Every nation has a 
choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government 
sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and 
murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril.”54  
   As this monolog suggests, there was clearly an assumption that terrorism was enabled through 
the support of regimes and governments. In this conflict Bush made it clear that there was no 
scope for impartiality and all countries had a decision to make: “Either you are with us, or you are with 
the terrorists”.55 This association with 'rogue states' would become the predominant strategic logic 
behind the ‘War on Terror’ but for the moment it lingered in the background while the focus was 
firmly on the impending intervention into Afghanistan.56 With the objectives and strategy 
defined, Bush met with his war cabinet to create an operational strategy for Afghanistan to meet 
the first challenge in the ‘War on Terror’; it was termed ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’. 
                                                 
50 ‘Bush/Gore Second Presidential Debate October 11’, Federation of American Scientists (11 October 2000) 
<http://www.fas.org/news/usa/2000/usa-001011.htm> [accessed 10 June 2010].  
51 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (London: Simon & Schuster, 2003), p.281. 
52 Bush, comment on “President Bush Launches Attack on Afghanistan”.   
53 ‘The 9/11 Commission Report’: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United 
States’ (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), p.330. 
54 Bush, comment on “President Bush Launches Attack on Afghanistan”. 
55 Bush, comment on “Transcript of President Bush's address to a joint session of Congress”, CNN (21 September 
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Objective: Overthrow of the Taliban 
 
   The impact of the 9/11 attacks hit a nerve across the international community and 
subsequently the U.S. enjoyed widespread approval for the intervention.57 In a context where 
genuine multilateralism can prove to be essential to an operation’s legitimisation, the ease at 
which the U.S. gathered international support ensured that the intervention would not be 
tarnished by aspersions of illegality from the international community. 
    Regional support was strategically and operationally more significant but theoretically more 
challenging. The central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan 
opportunistically assessed the benefits of an alliance with the U.S and were unanimous in making 
a collective offer of logistical support, while the U.S snatched at the opportunity. Russia followed 
suit by providing the U.S. with information and expertise from the Soviet intervention.58  Without 
any noticeable drama, the U.S. had established an alliance bordering the only territory in 
Afghanistan that was occupied by the opposition to the Taliban.  
   Yet Afghanistan’s northern neighbours were thousands of miles from the Taliban stronghold. 
Even if the regime were dislodged from Kabul, the Taliban would still enjoy a considerable 
support base in its territorial heartland in the south of the country and across the border into 
Pakistan. Occupying Kabul was one thing, defeating the regime was quite another. To enable this, 
the U.S. would require an influence among the regime’s principal support base - the Pashtuns. As 
it was Pakistan that had enabled the Taliban to conquer Afghanistan in the first place, an alliance 
with Islamabad was more strategically essential than any other.  
   Prior to 9/11, the relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan had traditionally been one of 
discomfort and mistrust.59 Yet after the Twin Towers fell, Pakistan was faced with an ultimatum - 
either ally with the United States or descend into isolation as an international rogue. In a tentative 
address to the nation, President Musharraf explained that the very survival of Pakistan 
necessitated an alliance with America.60 After nurturing and protecting the Taliban for so many 
years, Pakistan gave the impression of a dramatic about face by rejecting their former protégée 
                                                                                                                                                        
56 ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, The White House (2002), p.1. 
57 The intervention was authorised under resolution 1373 by “Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”. 'Security Council Resolution 
1373', United Nations Security Council (2001), <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/557/43/PDF/N0155743.pdf?OpenElement> [accessed 10 March 2010].  
58 Ibid, p.70. 
59 Ibid, p.61.  
60 Pervez Musharraaf, comment in “Text: Pakistan’s President Musharraf”, The Washington Post (19 September 2001) 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/pakistantext_091901.html> 
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and decidedly standing alongside the U.S.61 It seemed incredulous to many, but at least in theory 
Pakistan had turned its back on its Islamist allies and joined the U.S. in the ‘War on Terror’. With 
only Iran left on the sidelines, the U.S appeared content that it had amassed the necessary 
regional allies to launch the intervention.62 
 
The Overthrow Strategy 
 
   Interestingly, it could hardly be said that the fierce rhetorical resolve, which rose like a phoenix 
from the ashes of 9/11, was manifested in the overthrow strategy. Despite the offers of 
multilateral assistance from NATO partners, the intervention strategy was to be executed mostly 
unilaterally and with minimal foreign troop presence. In fact, initially the hope had been that large 
scale foreign forces could be avoided completely.63 Given the surprise of the 9/11 attacks, this 
reluctance was partly due to the absence of any “off-the-shelf”64 contingency plan. Yet also 
strategists were determined to avoid any repeat of the Soviet intervention. The logic of this 
approach was grounded on the assumption that the presence of foreign troops would aggravate 
the Afghans, unsettle Pakistan and foster resentment in the wider Muslim world.65  
   The strategy that developed sought to utilise Afghan military groups and tribes opposed to the 
Taliban to perform the overthrow while the U.S. presence and input would take the form of a 
'light footprint', decisive but very much in the background.66 By combining overwhelming force 
with highly mobile units, the sole objective of the strategy was to achieve a quick and definitive 
victory over the regime. What would happen after the Taliban had been toppled from power was 
deemed extraneous to the initial priorities.67  
   The local proxies with the greatest credibility for contesting the Taliban were known as the 
‘Northern Alliance’ (NA). Predominantly drawn from ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks, this military-
political umbrella organisation represented a somewhat ragtag collection of rebel factions 
commanded by autonomous ‘warlords’. For decades the Alliance had been plagued by infighting, 
united only by a disdain for the Taliban. Prior to the invasion the NA had been sponsored by the 
                                                 
61 When recounting the discussions between Pakistani President Musharraf and senior U.S. diplomatic staff, former 
U.S. ambassador to Pakistan Wendy Chamberlain recalls that “Pakistan was very cooperative”; comment in Jones, In the 
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opportunity to renovate relations with Tehran and later demonised the Iranian regime as part of an ‘axis of evil’ 
accused of assisting terrorism and seeking weapons of mass destruction. 
63 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p.61. 
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65 Michael O'Hanlon, 'A Flawed Masterpiece', Foreign Affairs, 81:3 (2002), p.49. 
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U.S. and had established credibility and contacts with American intelligence agencies.68 Indeed, 
immediately before 9/11 the NA had even started to gain “military and political momentum against the 
Taliban” .69 In terms of allying with local forces, the NA was the only plausible candidate. 
   With very few assets and limited intelligence of Afghanistan prior to the invasion, it was 
inevitable, or perhaps unavoidable, that the U.S. strategy utilised local proxies for the overthrow. 
Even though the strategy might have been born out of necessity rather than choice, the decision 
to use local proxies had some logic to it. For starters, local forces had an extensive knowledge of 
the countryside as well as the operational experience of working in it. Additionally, they 
understood the socio-political context as well as having familiarity with the enemy. In the case of 
the NA, they had been actively engaged with Taliban forces for all but a decade. In a military 
environment as testing as Afghanistan, familiarity with the land and its people is a valuable asset. 
Furthermore, as historians are well aware, the people of Afghanistan have traditionally despised 
external intervention and consequently it is likely that local forces ill be deemed a more 
legitimate with the locals than foreign troops. Lastly, from a crude cost benefit perspective, 
proxies were invariably cheaper in both financial and political costs than mobilising conventional 
forces.70 
   In assisting the NA, the CIA provided equipment, intelligence and financial assistance. 
Meanwhile special forces were attached to local NA units to provide tactical expertise on the 
ground, while U.S. and western air power provided fire support from the skies. Together this 
assortment of intelligence officers, international special forces, air power and native Afghan 
warriors formed the beginnings of what became known as the ‘Coalition’ that would embark 
upon the overthrow of the Taliban.  
   The operational strategy that emerged for the overthrow of the regime was simple in its design 
and involved three components. First and foremost, any of the regime’s military infrastructures 
would be demolished by U.S. and NATO air power. Secondly, local NA fighters would engage 
Taliban positions with assistance from special forces and intelligence agents and supported by air 
power, heavy artillery and sophisticated long distance weaponry from naval ships located in the 
Indian ocean. Thirdly, huge financial inducements would be offered to entice tribesmen in 
Taliban occupied territories and strongholds to rise up and support the Coalition's efforts.71 With 
this operational strategy clarified in design, let us assess its implementation in practice. 
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The ‘Afghan Model’ in Practice 
 
   The initial bombing campaign of Taliban infrastructure and static ground targets as a prelude to 
the ground offensive was predictable given the merit U.S. forces attributed to strategic bombing 
from past conflict such as the first Gulf War and Kosovo.72 The task was not enormous and the 
Coalition air forces had obliterated the short list of credible targets within the first two nights.73 
Given the paucity of targets and the extent to which the world’s most advanced military 
obliterated the ramshackle defensive hardware of a vastly inferior adversary, commentators have 
understandably elected not to exhaust analysis on what was ultimately an inevitable outcome.74  
   Of more significance were the events that followed. For phase two of the overthrow strategy 
Taliban positions were heavily bombed by Coalition air power while NA forces were let loose on 
the Taliban’s damaged positions. On the face of it, the strategy appeared to pay off. In less than a 
week, the majority of northern, western and central Afghanistan had been captured by the NA 
while the remnants of Taliban fighters became caught in a “shooting gallery”75 by NA forces or 
Coalition air power as they attempted to regroup. The remainder of Taliban forces simply melted 
away. Meanwhile in the south of the country, the extent to which “money is the lubricant that makes 
things happen in Afghanistan”76 was being realised. Bribes and negotiations successfully galvanised 
Pashtun militias to rise up in the key southern and eastern areas of the country. Coordinated 
alongside NA advances and air attacks the pressure on the Taliban ground troops mounted and 
by the end of November 2001 the last Taliban strongholds of Kunduz and Kandahar eventually 
fell. On December 5th 2001, the Taliban surrendered, the regime had been successfully toppled 
and its remnants went underground or took to hills. On the face of it, the Taliban were no longer 
a recognised entity.77   
   Estimates suggest that the Taliban at this stage had managed to accumulate roughly 60,000 
troops and were frequently strengthened by reinforcements from Pakistan.78 In layman’s terms, 
                                                 
72 For an overview of the expansion of strategic bombing see; John Buckley, Air Power in the Age of Total War 
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the Coalition ground troops were outnumbered roughly 4:1.79 Nevertheless, only three months 
later, the regime had effectively collapsed and the remnants of the Taliban forces were 
surrendering in droves. The objective of overthrowing the regime was achieved with only a few 
NA casualties and one U.S fatality. By January 2002, the whole operation had cost only $3.8 
billion, a pittance compared to other contemporary military ventures.80  
   The speed and efficiency with which the operation was achieved led observers to describe the 
effectiveness of the strategy as "awe-inspiring".81 Some commentators went even further, 
suggesting that this operational strategy “will likely be remembered as one of the greater military successes of 
the twenty-first century”.82 Based purely on the immediate outcome, it could be argued that the 
operational strategy which led to the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan served its 
purpose and successfully met the strategic objectives with the additional benefit of minimal costs.  
   However some critics have hesitated over giving unconditional praise to the strategy, suggesting 
instead that the success of the overthrow campaign is better explained by the character of the 
enemy than by the effectiveness of the strategy.83  
   The firstly argument is pioneered by Steven Biddle and suggests that the tactical incompetence 
of the Taliban front line troops is the determining factor behind the regime’s dramatic collapse. 
Prior to the invasion, strategists appeared to have been concerned by reports suggesting the 
Taliban was a formidable foe.84 However Biddle argues to the contrary, suggesting that the 
majority of the Taliban’s front line troops were only part-time soldiers and highly unskilled.85 The 
true extent of this was perhaps most aptly exposed when Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s leader, 
supposedly demanded that his troops stop “behaving like chickens”.86 Biddle supports this argument 
by suggesting that the rank and file of the Taliban were largely apathetic regarding ideology 
which, in the context of successive barrages from the Coalition, perpetuated a culture of low 
morale and disinterest.87 I deed, evidence suggests that a great number of Taliban chose to desert 
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80 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p.97.  
81 Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, p.108. 
82 O'Hanlon, 'A Flawed Masterpiece', p.63. 
83 See; Stephen D. Biddle, 'Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare', Foreign Affairs, 82:2 (2003) pp.31-46, O'Hanlon, 
'A Flawed Masterpiece', and, Milan Vego, 'What Can We Learn from Enduring Freedom', U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, (July 2002), pp.28-33. 
84 Paul Harris, “The Rout of the Taliban”, The Guardian, (18 November 2001) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2001/nov/18/terrorism.afghanistan> [accessed 12 October 2010]. 
85 Stephen D. Biddle, 'Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq', 
International Security, 30:3 (2005/6), p.168. 
86 Mullah Omar, comment in O’Hanlon, 'A Flawed Masterpiece', p.52. 
87 Stephen D. Biddle, 'Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy' 











  24 
while others actively turned against their former comrades, truly revealing the extent to which the 
regime relied on amateur and unmotivated fighters.88  
   By contrast, in areas where proficient Taliban fighters and al Qaeda resided, NA troops appear 
to have experienced greater difficulty and on a number of occasions were forced to withdraw.89 
However this group of hardliners is not representative of the majority of Taliban front-line 
troops during the overthrow stage. Instead, Coalition forces faced an unimpressive collection of 
amateurs which actually posed very little threat.90 
   Secondly, it would appear that the Taliban’s operational strategy was equally unimpressive. The 
military historian Sean Maloney, who was accompanying Coalition forces, points out that the 
Taliban were, by and large, structured as a conventional military, meaning the linear positions 
they adopted in the field were simple targets for air attacks.91 Closely bunched, lacking in 
overhead air or artillery cover and in poorly entrenched positions the Taliban were immensely 
vulnerable. Their positions could be seen by U.S. operators at great distances and posed simple 
targets for coordinated air attacks.92 As well as decimating troops on the ground, the Coalition’s 
overwhelming airpower erased the notion of a ‘front line’ ensuring all Taliban occupied territory 
was exposed to attack. This crippled the support systems of the Taliban military. Without the 
capacity to re-supply, run communications, utilise heavy weaponry or even move around freely 
without fear of air attack, all the most basic tasks of a conventional military were rendered 
impossible.93  
   O’Hanlon suggests that had the Taliban opted for a less conventional strategy, air power would 
have imposed a less notable impact while NA fighters would probably have been too few on the 
ground to defeat them.94 Therefore in terms of military capacity, the poor quality of the Taliban 
forces and their imprudent choice of a conventional defensive strategy played entirely to the 
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Summary – Overthrow of the Taliban 
 
   This strategic assessment of the first phase of the intervention reveals how strategic outcomes 
are not necessarily defined by specific components of the strategy. When considering the success 
of the Regime’s overthrow, the capacity of the enemy must be taken into account. In this regard 
the effectiveness of toppling the regime is better explained by a force ‘mismatch’ than by the 
revolutionary strategic elements of the ‘Afghan model’.96 Instead of being motivated, professional 
and ideologically determined militants, the majority of the Taliban’s front line troops were poorly 
trained part time fighters who were more inclined to scarper and defect than stand and fight. 
Furthermore the Taliban’s conventional choice of strategy played to the advantage of the 
Coalition and their forces were easy prey to an overwhelming disparity of force which ensured 
the Taliban’s dissipation as a perceptible military force. In essence, the U.S. “possessed overwhelming 
power and faced a weak opponent”.97 The evaporation of the regime is better explained by these 
factors than any kind of strategic innovation. 
   This said, the strategy did nonetheless succeed as it efficiently “removed [Taliban] forces from the 
field”.98 Approximately 20 percent of the Taliban's fighting force had been killed and a further 
7,000 taken prisoner.99 At this stage at least, the strategy had served its purpose. Strategists were 
pleasantly surprised with the outcome, as one Whitehall official notes: “If you had asked me where we 
would all like to be by the middle of November I would have settled for this. So far, so good”.100 As far as the 
Coalition was concerned, the strategy for the overthrow had been an unprecedented triumph.  
   However although the Coalition had effectively toppled the regime, in doing so they had 
revealed their trump card and instead of analysing the true determinants of the triumphant 
overthrow, policy makers became blinded by their own success. Excessive self assurance began to 
impose itself on the decision making process while authentic strategic considerations suffered as 
a consequence.101 As the character of the conflict made a radical shift away from conventional 
warfare, the strategy remained perilously stagnant. This ensured that the accomplishments of the 
‘Afghan Model’ in overthrowing the regime would have hugely detrimental effects to the longer 
term strategic objectives of the intervention. 
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Objective: Hunt Out Al Qaeda 
 
   By December 2001, the remnants of the Taliban regime rallied alongside the more skilled al 
Qaeda and Taliban fighters and made their way east towards the border with Pakistan, to an area 
known as Tora Bora.102 As far as al Qaeda was concerned, the rugged mountainous terrain, 
littered with intricate caving systems and passages would provided excellent conditions for a 
determined stand.103 The small band of Western special forces and their Afghan colleagues 
followed in pursuit. Figures are desperately unsubstantiated but vague estimations place the 
number of al Qaeda and Taliban in the area as numbering somewhere between 500-3000.104 More 
significantly, it has become widely accepted that in their midst was the leadership of both al 
Qaeda and the Taliban.105 Whether they were captured or killed, it mattered little, the objective 
was to round up al Qaeda and “see [the terrorists] brought to justice”.106 
   In the wake of the battlefield ‘successes’ up to this point, the Bush administration remained 
devoted to the operational strategy used in the overthrow of the regime.107 Following an intense 
bombing campaign, local forces would 'sweep' through the mountain passes capturing or killing 
the defenders. It was anticipated that the remaining enemy forces would inadvertently flee 
towards other local forces 'blocking' their escape routes.108  
   Despite the inordinate amount of explosives that Coalition forces rained in on al Qaeda 
positions, a great number of the defenders weathered the bombardment. On the ground, 
progress was slow and local forces rarely defeated al Qaeda face to face, only taking territory 
when the defenders themselves chose to withdraw. Minimal casualties were caused by bombing 
and the ‘sweeping’ and ‘blocking’ forces made very few captures.109 By the end of the operation, 
only three hundred bodies, another hundred or so freshly dug graves, and a few prisoners were 
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found.110 In addition, none of these people, dead or alive, were identified as being senior 
members of the Taliban or al Qaeda. Although the final morsel of Taliban/al Qaeda territory had 
been captured, the nucleus of al Qaeda’s rearguard was neither dead nor alive; they had simply 
vanished. 
  
A Competent Enemy 
  
   As suggested in the previous section, the perceived effectiveness of local allies in the ‘Afghan 
Model’ was artificially exaggerated by a disproportionate impact of U.S. airpower and technical 
fallibilities on the part of the enemy. In the caves of Tora Bora, the context was very different 
from the battlefields where Taliban forces had been routed in the preceding months.  
   Firstly, the environment was ideal for a defensive position. Situated at 14,000 ft above sea level, 
the defenders had fortified commanding fire positions with caving systems that went deep into 
the mountainside. They were well stocked and had excellent knowledge of the geographical 
area.111 In itself, the extreme terrain and virtual ‘fortress style’ defences meant that the tactical 
location provided the ultimate 'force multiplier' for the defending troops.112  
   Secondly, the enemy was far more skilful and tactically aware than the Taliban forces from 
preceding operations. This enemy was well trained, motivated and experienced.113 They had learnt 
from their past mistakes in the earlier stages of Operation Enduring Freedom and now concealed 
themselves better, adopting a strategy that better resembled irregular mountain guerrillas than 
conventional forces.114 In this sense "standoff precision bombing became far less effective"115 and the 
attackers could not rely on overwhelming force to scatter amateurish opposition as it had done 
before.  
   So even before local forces engaged with the al Qaeda and Taliban forces hidden in the 
mountainous border regions, the two points outlined above suggest that the balance of tactical 
advantage had shifted decisively to the defenders. Indeed their position was deemed so 
formidable that some commentators have suggested that “even a highly motivated, well trained, and well 
equipped modern army would have had trouble”.116 
 
                                                 
110 John Donnelly, ‘How US Strategy in Tora Bora Failed’, Boston Globe (10 February 2002) 
<http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0210-05.htm> [accessed 12 October 2010]. 
111 Ibid, p.4. 
112 Krause, ‘The Last Good Chance’, p.676. 
113 Ibid, p.651.  
114 Biddle, 'Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare', p.35. 
115 Biddle, 'Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare', p.169. 










  28 
The Limits of Local Proxies 
 
   The evidence suggests that the local forces selected to embark on this perilous yet critical 
climactic mission were anything but 'highly motivated, well trained or well equipped'. Unable to 
use the NA forces due to the societal complications of having ethnic Tajik or Uzbek forces in 
Pashtun-dominated areas, U.S. operators were forced to enlist the assistance of minor local 
warlords with unscrupulous reputations together with a ramshackle collection of troops of less 
experience and of even poorer quality than their NA counterparts.117  
   The implications of this were significant. Attacks were persistently repelled while the local 
forces showed a recurring willingness to retire from the battlefield.118 Gary Berntsen, the principal 
CIA operator at Tora Bora claims that the incapacity of local forces meant frustratingly slow 
progress, thereby allowing significant bands of al Qaeda to evade capture and slip into Pakistan.119 
To make matters worse the local warlords also functioned under their own agendas and "at key 
junctures of the battle, the Americans learned they had little or no control".120 In one case, on the 12th 
December 2001, a miscellaneous al Qaeda group was cornered in the mountains by local General 
Zaman. Instead of pushing on with an assault, Zaman offered a truce. Commentators have 
suggested that this intermission enabled the escape of around 1,000 al Qaeda members.121 At 
other times, local allies were reluctant to fight or pursue targets, preferring to stake their claims in 
newly captured lands.122  
   In order to keep their local agents focused, vast sums of money were used as inducements. 
Richard Clarke estimates that during this period an estimated $70 million dollars were used as 
bribes - however the figure could be as high as $100 million.123 Infuriatingly for the U.S., it 
appears the practice of bribery was not a tactic exclusive to the coalition: in some instances al 
Qaeda appeared to have induced CIA funded militias to escort them into Pakistan. Indeed, 
Rashid estimates that around 600-800 al Qaeda escaped from Tora Bora with the help of 
entrepreneurial Pashtun guides.124 This frustrating situation led CIA leader Gary Schroen to 
comment despairingly that “you cannot buy an Afghan’s loyalty, but you can rent it”.125 
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   Ultimately this evidence queries the wisdom of using local Afghan forces in a complex and 
demanding tactical situation such as the one presented at Tora Bora. Unsurprisingly, these groups 
were not as interested in applying the same level of 'retributive justice' to al Qaeda as U.S. forces 
would have been. In fact the motivations of these local proxies were exceptionally dubious. It is 
most likely that the majority of local commanders saw their U.S. allies as interim bedfellows. 
Once their pay cheques had been cashed and the Taliban had been removed from their privately 
controlled territories, they no longer had any impetus for rounding up al Qaeda and the remnants 
of the regime. Andres et al identify how "motivation is a critical factor in war".126 As far as local forces 
were concerned Tora Bora was a dangerous place occupied by ruthless defenders. Given that 
they had already toppled the regime, what did they have to gain from the pursuit of a few al 
Qaeda fugitives?  
   Instead the local forces used in Tora Bora proved to be unmotivated, unreliable and tactically 
inferior to the opposition that they faced. For this reason, observers have questioned why the 
strategy to use such forces was agreed at a critical stage when the stakes were so high and the 
ultimate objective of capturing the al Qaeda conspirators of 9/11 was in sight.127 Despite the 
relative successes of local forces in the overthrow stage of the operation, relying on similar, if not 
perhaps even less capable forces, for the much more technical task of rounding up al Qaeda was 
a grossly unrealistic expectation.  
   While the local Pashtun militias made up the 'sweep' of the operation, it was predominantly 
4,000 soldiers from Pakistan's frontier corps that provided the 'blocking' element along the 
border.128 Theoretically, enlisting the support of Pakistan's security forces was absolutely essential 
as they possessed the best intelligence on the Taliban and al Qaeda as well as having large scale 
ground troops in the area available for deployment, and with experience of operations in the 
area.129 Pakistan's assistance should have been critical not only in blocking off escape routes but 
also in identifying, locating and confronting enemy targets.  
   However, in practice, the Pakistani link actually proved to be more problematic than it was 
helpful. The critical factor here is that prior to 9/11 Pakistani security forces had been in cohorts 
with the Taliban. Even if a political u-turn had occurred in Islamabad it was perhaps naïve to 
expect Pakistani ISI officers working in Afghanistan to turn on their allies overnight.130 Indeed 
the evidence suggests that many ISI officers continued to work alongside Taliban forces 
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throughout the intervention.131 Gary Schroen suggests that during this period the ISI operated on 
a very different agenda from the official line in Islamabad and frequently worked to frustrate U.S. 
ambitions and protect Taliban interests. With hindsight Schroen believes that the U.S. reliance on 
Pakistan was a “disturbing and a real mistake”.132 Rashid alludes to another interesting instance 
where Pakistan appears to have made a plea to the U.S. to allow planes in to pick up ISI 
operatives cornered in Kunduz, where they had actually been had been fighting alongside Taliban 
forces. The U.S. apparently allowed the airlift, and when Kunduz did finally surrender, Rashid 
suggests that there were thousands of al Qaeda and Taliban members missing. The event was 
later dubbed by a retired Pakistani Colonel as the ‘Great Escape’.133 
   Consequently, with both the 'sweep' and the 'block' aspects of the strategy either unreliable or 
ineffective, the principal question among commentators is why the U.S. chose not to conduct 
these operations with U.S. or Western troops who possessed the skills and motivation to 
confront al Qaeda and the rearguard of the Taliban.  
 
Western Ground Troops  
 
  To an extent, U.S. and Western forces were already engaged in counterterrorist operations in 
Afghanistan from the outset. The requirement for highly mobile, ruthlessly efficient forces 
trained specifically for harsh environments and covert operations meant that special forces were 
the ideal tactical utility.134 In keeping with the doctrine of 'small footprint', clandestine special 
forces conducted a number of small-scale operations on suspected al Qaeda and Taliban 
locations in the border regions. Some commentators argue that the special forces contribution to 
this phase was a textbook performance.135 When contact was made with Taliban or al Qaeda 
forces, it only ever had one outcome. Any locations that were deemed safe havens had their 
stockpiles stripped and the facility destroyed. 
   However in reality it would appear that a significant amount of al Qaeda escaped the wrath of 
"America’s avenging angels”.136 This is not a slight on the operational efficiency of special forces but 
it appears there were simply too few of these units on the ground to even come close to covering 
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the complex web of compounds, caves and passages in the extensive border regions.137 Several 
thousand square miles and only a few hundred special forces available was an equation that 
simply did not add up. The only plausible alternative was conventional ground troops. 
   However introducing ground troops to Afghanistan was no easy task, as it faced logistical as 
well as political challenges. U.S. strategists were concerned that helicopter insertions in the 
mountains were vulnerable to attacks from the surrounding ridges. The same danger applied to 
re-supplying and evacuation operations.138 The altitude at which U.S. forces would be operating 
would be a first in U.S. military history. The mission was deemed to be unavoidably dangerous 
and casualties were widely considered to be inevitable.139 With so many unknowns and potential 
risks, it is at least understandable that the US was reluctant to risk front line combat troops. 
Additionally, from a political perspective, strategists were certain that U.S. or foreign ground 
troop presence would cause outrage in Afghanistan and the wider Muslim world.140 The last thing 
strategists would want to do was to exacerbate Islamic grievances. Taking into account both of 
these factors, the conundrum for strategists was epitomised in a comment made by Colonel Mark 
Rosengard, director of operations for Task Force Dagger, who described Afghanistan as “the most 
strategically impossible place to introduce force on the entire…planet".141   
   Hindsight however suggests that Rosengard's claims of 'mission impossible' may be 
exaggerated. The political implications of temporarily deploying a few thousand U.S. troops 
appear somewhat irrelevant in the context of the 150,000 or so foreign troops that were based in 
Afghanistan between 2010 and 2011.142 Furthermore, the effort to keep casualty figures down 
could be deemed obsolete given that U.S. forces have now lost over 1,600 soldiers since the Tora 
Bora operation came to a close.143 Of course these developments were unforeseen; nonetheless it 
does put this strategic decision into context with what was to follow.  
   Even when extra troops were deployed, the numbers were hardly significant. By December 
2001 there were only 1,300 U.S. troops spread throughout Afghanistan. The majority of these 
were U.S. Marines stationed at Kandahar carrying out little more than support roles.144 Richard A. 
Clarke aptly put this shortfall into perspective when he stated there were “fewer U.S. troops for all of 
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Afghanistan than the number of NYPD assigned to Manhattan”.145 This figure could scarcely even begin 
to cover the vast and difficult terrain of Afghanistan with its widely dispersed population.  
   Indeed some assessments on counterinsurgency activity in Afghanistan have proposed a 10:1 
ratio in favour of the defenders in such operations.146 As al Qaeda and the Taliban had essentially 
adopted guerrilla tactics by December 2001, and with some estimates suggesting there were more 
al Qaeda defenders than attackers, the extent to which the strategy neglected to meet this maxim 
for defence-offensive ratios is colossal.147 Other commentators are more pragmatic, suggesting 
that with an additional 1,000 to 3,000 U.S. troops, the 100-150 possible escape routes at Tora 
Bora could have been covered, even if the figure was still uncomfortably meagre.148 
   When U.S. ground troops were eventually deployed to frontline duties, many strategists felt that 
this deployment was too little too late.149 It was also deemed especially frustrating given the 
proximity of Western troops at the time.150 The logistics of deploying these forces may have been 
challenging, but U.S. and other NATO troops were in the area nonetheless. Rashid is adamant 
that the unwillingness to deploy U.S. troops is a key reason why so many al Qaeda and Taliban 
fighters managed to evade capture.151 Biddle supports this argument by implying that this type of 
operation required the best quality of soldiers and "western conventional infantry were superior to all other 
combatants but their SOF [Special Forces] comrades".152 Strategic decision making is always partial to the 
options available, however in this case mobilising Western troops was a workable alternative that 
might have maximised the opportunity for success in this critical objective. 
   When regular forces were eventually deployed in combat roles, it was not until March 2002 
during the second major attempt to round up al Qaeda fighters in what was aptly termed 
Operation Anaconda. Operating in the Shahi-Kot Valley only 130 km from Tora Bora, the 
Coalition faced a similar threat and equally taxing environment.153 After supposedly learning from 
their mistakes at Tora Bora, this time U.S. strategy sought to adopt a 'hammer and anvil' 
approach which incorporated both local troops and U.S. Marines. Local troops formed the 
'hammer' and would drive the defenders towards U.S. Marines acting as the 'anvil'.  
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   But once again local forces were repelled. In theory the operation was meant to be completed 
within 24 hours; in reality it took 10 days.154 Biddle argues that it was only with the assistance of 
Western infantry that local forces eventually managed to dislodge the defenders.155 Even when al 
Qaeda and the Taliban were driven towards the anvil, they inverted the strategy on its head by 
pinning down U.S. troops from the high ground. The incident proved to be exceptionally 
challenging, and analysts have suggested the whole operation was "a humbling experience for the 
Americans".156 Nevertheless, as Kraus argues, the presence of U.S. forces did help "turn the tide of 
battle from a potential debacle into an incomplete victory".157 Subsequently, the events of operation 
Anaconda demonstrated that inserting more foreign troops alongside local forces was an 
improvement on the previous model, but was not enough in itself to be the solution.  
   The decision not to deploy regular troops also had other consequences. With the Taliban 
‘regime’ effectively removed by NA forces, there was an urgent need for some form of civil 
security. A complete absence of this anywhere outside of Kabul resulted in the menacing rise of 
tribalism as local militias, many of whom were funded by the U.S., were quick to take advantage 
of the security void. This ‘third dimension’ added another complication to security and proved 
undermining in the long term to both the authority of Kabul and the security of Coalition 
forces.158 During the Taliban’s tenure, its ability to purge Afghanistan of local militias was 
perhaps the sole benefit of the regime in the eyes of local Afghans. The re-emergence of the 
‘warlord’ greatly unsettled the rural population and immediately established a grievance among 
local Afghans.159 
   In a crude attempt to deal with opportunistic local militias, once again the U.S. used 
inducements to bribe local warlords in the hope that they would provide ground troops and act 
as sources of information for the Coalition. Yet Ignatieff observes that "if you feed a snake, it may 
return to bite you".160 As any reader of proxy warfare or Afghan history is only too aware, the risk in 
bribing and arming the local population has historically proven to be hugely problematic to 
security in the longer term.161 In this instance, it was precisely the case. Local forces proved too 
autonomous in their behaviour and far from reliable. Rashid argues that the tactic of buying off 
warlords “only created further mayhem in the countryside”.162 Good pay, lack of accountability and the 
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accumulation of substantial weapons stocks were dangerously destabilising, and the sponsorship 
by the U.S. meant that the process of militarisation in the countryside became a self-perpetuating 
issue. With each day that passed, any step towards disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR) became increasingly difficult to execute. 
 
Summary – Hunt Out al Qaeda  
 
   Critiques of this stage in the Afghanistan strategy vary significantly. For some scholars, the 
operations at Tora Bora and the surrounding areas, although failing to strike at the head of al 
Qaeda’s leadership, did successfully eradicate the last Afghan sanctuary, severely damaging the 
organisation’s capacity and putting al Qaeda on the run for life.163 Other critiques have suggested 
the strategy was a categorical disaster in which “the failure to finish the job altered the course of the conflict 
in Afghanistan and the future of international terrorism”.164 Either way, there is overwhelming consensus 
that it was at this critical juncture that the U.S. came closest to its objective of seizing or killing 
Osama bin Laden and his lieutenants. 
   Trapped in a conventional mindset, the U.S. leadership may have been so in awe of the 'Afghan 
model' that hubris lead strategists to overestimate its value.165 When the objectives shifted from 
the overthrow of the regime to rooting out the remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban, the 
'Afghan model' proved itself ineffective. Local forces were insufficient in both skill and 
motivation to confront determined and quality irregular forces. Furthermore it is highly likely 
many local elements, including the Pakistani security forces, were in collusion with the Taliban.166 
Where professional Western special forces were used, they were inadequate in number to cover 
the gruelling topography of the extensive Afghan landscape. Slow progress combined with 
ineffective airpower failed to overrun the stalwart defences of the Taliban and al Qaeda. This 
allowed the most ruthless and effective remnants of the regime and al Qaeda to quietly slip away 
into Pakistan.167 Furthermore, the absence of large-scale forces left a security void which would 
soon be filled by entrepreneurial warlords laying the foundations for a decade of perpetual 
insecurity in the Afghan countryside.  
   For the majority of commentators, the key variable to address these issues was to deploy the 
best available U.S. or Western troops. Ultimately the challenge was both considerable and 
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dangerous. Adopting a strategy which had Western forces at its core involved both logistical and 
political risks. Nevertheless, in terms of applying the available ‘means’ to meet the desired 
objectives of eliminating the threat posed by al Qaeda and the Taliban, deploying Western 
conventional troops would have been the logical option. Failure to do so ensured that al Qaeda 
and the Taliban were never hit by the hammering blow promised by the intervention.  
 
Conclusion – ‘Now the Taliban will pay a price’ 
 
   Although not a perfect outcome, by the summer of 2002, for many U.S. policy makers it 
seemed that the key objectives of 'Operation Enduring Freedom' had been achieved. The Taliban 
regime had been toppled and al Qaeda’s training bases in Afghanistan had been severely 
disrupted. Although bin Laden and his senior lieutenants were still active, the sentiment among 
U.S. defence strategists was “we will catch him, dead or alive…he cannot hide in the mountains forever”.168 
As an additional benefit, Coalition casualties and financial costs had been minimal. Furthermore 
the intervention had been widely deemed as legitimate by the international community and the 
majority of Afghan people appeared to approve of the ejection of the Taliban.169 
   Even though the regime had been toppled at a low cost and with spectacular efficiency, the 
strategy had failed in the crucial objective of hunting out what was left of al Qaeda. Furthermore 
many astute observers argued that the Taliban collapse had been "more apparent than real".170 
Ultimately the enemy was undefeated and it would not be long until the Taliban orchestrated 
their riposte, while the illusion of success would rapidly fade away. 
   By toppling the regime so effectively, policy makers were lured into a false sense of 
achievement. Simply replicating the model at a time when the temperament of the conflict had 
already evolved was inadequate at meeting the more demanding objective of capturing and 
defeating al Qaeda. Instead strategists demonstrated an unwillingness to apply the available 
‘means’ at their disposal thereby revealing a divergence between stated strategic objectives and 
what they were willing to implement.  
   Even if this had been rectified, it may not have guaranteed success in this crucial second 
objective. The capture of bin Laden at this early stage would by no means have guaranteed 
‘victory’. As Pillar correctly identifies, the ‘War on Terror’ was not a game of chess when all 
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comes to an end with the capture of the King.171 However historical analysis reveals "that terrorist 
groups are invariably much stronger with their charismatic leaders than without them".172 Hawkins supports 
this argument by proposing that when terrorists are "beaten or in retreat, they cannot be allowed to 
survive and re-group".173 These authors argue that although the task was challenging, the one luxury 
the U.S. did have at this stage, which would increasingly disappear with time, was an opportunity 
to do just this. Employing all the available resources was essential to give the operation the 
greatest possible chance of meeting this objective. 
   Yet even if the intervention had been operationally flawless, the extent to which this style of 
military operation adequately combats the threat of Islamic terrorism is unconvincing. The enemy 
on September 11th was not Afghanistan, nor was it the regime that governed the country. The real 
threat knew no boundaries and operated from hotel rooms in cosmopolitan cities like London 
and Hamburg. Its business was conducted with the assistance of Western communications 
technology and funding from wealthy individuals with off-shore bank accounts. The enemy was 
more of an attitude of mind than a fully operational entity - an unconventional adversary in every 
sense.174 Al Qaeda certainly had bases in Afghanistan, but its true strength was defined by its 
clandestine franchise, immersed among the populace in many different political and social 
environments.175   
   The anger that manifested itself after 9/11 necessitated that the administration embark on a 
discernable riposte against al Qaeda. However a reaction for reaction’s sake is not necessarily 
strategically logical. Shrouded in the cognitive realms of classical realism and traditional self 
defence, the U.S. hoped that an intervention into the country where the terrorists were protected 
would deliver the fatal counterpunch. Unfortunately the strategists missed the point. Even when 
it lost Afghanistan as a base, this did not affect al Qaeda’s ability to launch terrorist attacks to the 
extent that strategists had hoped.176 Al Qaeda’s strength was not its geographical base but its 
suppleness and transient manoeuvrability. Expulsion from its headquarters may have temporarily 
damaged its conventional capacity but it also made it harder to locate and confront. As with so 
many other guerrilla groups of the past, al Qaeda were able to fade into the background, whether 
that be in the dense woodland of the FATA valley or in the adjacent street in any of the West’s 
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cosmopolitan cities. From the very outset, the intervention in Afghanistan would play a part in a 
counterterrorism strategy, but it was only ever going to be limited.177 
*** 
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Chapter 3 
January 2003 – October 2008 
 ‘Steadfast in our purpose, we now press on’ 178 
 
   With the fall of the Taliban, a wave of sanguinity engulfed the U.S. administration, leading 
Defence Secretary Rumsfeld in May 2003 to prematurely state that “major combat activity” 179 had 
ended in Afghanistan. With this pronouncement the administration now had license to 
concentrate on the next stage of the 'War on Terror'. By the spring of 2002, Iraq was in 
Washington's sights and on the 20th March 2003 the U.S. and a ‘Coalition of the willing’180 
officially began combat operations in Iraq.   
   Meanwhile the conflict in Afghanistan continued to seethe with volatility. U.S. policy makers, 
blissfully naïve of the long-term implications of failing to defeat their enemy, had brazenly shifted 
their attention elsewhere. The ‘light footprint’ approach in Afghanistan was about to get even 
lighter. 
 
Strategic Objectives – January 2003 
 
   With the objectives of the intervention in Afghanistan assumed to be mostly accomplished, 
U.S. grand strategy from 2003 onwards elaborated and expanded on the strategic logic outlined in 
Chapter 2. What followed was widely recognised to be “the most sweeping redesign of U.S. grand 
strategy since the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt”.181 Similar to Roosevelt, the shift had been defined 
by national tragedy. America had now awoken to the fact that unprecedented devastation could 
be inflicted on the U.S. homeland by relatively unsophisticated means. Yet in identifying the chief 
security threat, strategists shifted policy focus away from asymmetric terrorism and towards the 
notion of ‘rogue states’. In a highly pugnacious State of the Union address, President Bush 
claimed “the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons”.182 Of these threats, Bush singled out three regimes which he termed 
the ‘axis of evil’, which included Iran, North Korea and Iraq. These three regimes replaced 
terrorist groups as the ultimate proprietors of terror - aggressive, unpredictable and capable of 
launching weapons of mass destruction.  
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   In reality, the links these regimes had to international terrorism was speculative at best. Yet the 
strategic connection was simple. The prospects of similar surprise attacks meant that the U.S. was 
obliged to “act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed”.183 As a result, a doctrine of pre-
emptive self-defence became engrained into the U.S. grand strategy.184  
   It was in this context that Iraq came to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. Accusations that 
Iraq was developing weapons of mass destruction and sponsoring terrorism, as well as having a 
history of aggression towards its own people, were amassed into an ambiguous rationale for 
intervention.185 Regardless of which raison d’être took precedence, ultimately the public 
justification for intervention was that Iraq posed a direct and imminent threat to the U.S. and her 
allies. After ‘regime removal’, the strategic logic assumed a Liberal nation-building plan would 
allow Western norms of freedom and democracy to prevail. As these values matured, a de facto 
‘mission civilisatrice’ would be achieved, and Iraq would cease to be a threat. 186 
    Unlike Afghanistan, there was to be no ‘light footprint’ in the overthrow of Saddam’s regime. 
The operational strategy was rooted in the doctrine of ‘overwhelming force’ to bring about a 
rapid and conclusive victory.187 In successfully paralysing Iraqi resistance, victory was swift and 
brutal.188 Regime removal in Iraq was achieved in little over a month, leading President Bush to 
publicly declare 'mission accomplished' on May 1st 2003.189 
   It was not long before it became glaringly obvious that the broad strategy of the 'War on 
Terror' had overstretched itself. The security environment in both Iraq and Afghanistan quickly 
mutated into insurgencies, casualties began to mount and the nation-building process stumbled. 
It became clear that a methodical post-overthrow reconstruction strategy for both Iraq and 
Afghanistan was perilously absent.190 The honeymoon period for successive rapid victories came 
to an abrupt end. Now the U.S. and her allies would have to deal with the consequences of an 
overly ambitious strategy.   
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   With military capacity highly overstretched and Iraq considered the principal concern, 
Afghanistan as a priority was relegated to the second tier. Until this point some commentators 
felt that the intervention in Afghanistan “has every chance of success on the condition that outside support is 
maintained militarily and economically”.191 Whether these aspirations could have been met is now 
somewhat superfluous to the debate. Yet equipped with a historical knowledge of the troubled 
country of Afghanistan, it is reasonable to suggest that a lack of attention at this critical post 
overthrow stage is perhaps the most blatant provision for failure. 
   Despite warnings from the experts, strategists were both unwilling and unable to adapt the 
strategy. The U.S. made it clear that “nation-building is not our key strategic goal”.192 While 
responsibility was handed over to the international community, the strategic commitment to the 
'light footprint' persevered into the much more complex task of ‘nation-building’.193 In the 
absence of an alternative, the strategy for Afghanistan became based on the principle of local 
‘ownership’.194 The international security presence would remain minimal, relying instead on local 
forces. The political development of the country would be left in the hands of Afghans and the 
aid and development efforts would fall under the same criteria. In terms of resources, the nation-
building programme in Afghanistan would be one of the most economical to date.195 In reference 
to the nominal assets dedicated to rebuilding Afghanistan, this became famously termed the 
strategy of 'nation-building lite' by Michael Ignatieff among other leading scholars.196 With the 
war in Iraq soaking up resources, the significance of the 'lite' soon began to be felt.    
   As one of the American founding fathers, Benjamin Franklin, once stated, “a little neglect may 
breed great mischief”.197 This observation was to be proven by subsequent events in Afghanistan. 
The small avenue of opportunity that had revealed itself following the fall of the Taliban was 
shattered as Afghanistan was pushed to the back of the shelf. The subsequent years saw the 
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creation of a strategy that reflected this. The process can be broken down into three distinct areas 
of strategic interest - political development, security and aid and development. 
    
Objective: Political Development 
 
   The overwhelming trend in post conflict nation-building programmes is to adhere strictly to a 
liberal political model.198 Traditionally this involves three stages. The first is more commonly 
known as ‘post conflict reconstruction’ and - at the political level - this normally involves a short-
term provision of stability through negotiations and the establishment of a preliminary authority 
to take over from the existing vacuum. The second stage involves the creation of sustainable 
institutions, thereby allowing for an element of local administrative autonomy. The final stage is 
interrelated with the second and involves the creation of a political body with both authority and 
legitimacy. Classically this is achieved through liberal constructs such as the rule of law, elections 
and representative government.199   
   On the face of it, the Afghan peacebuilding strategy represented this classic model. First and 
foremost, the strategy worked towards creating an interim authority to be established in the short 
term. Then for stages two and three, UNAMA, with the assistance of the international 
community, worked alongside a new Afghan government to support the development of 
centralised institutions intended to create a democratic, representative and legitimate government 
that would serve Afghanistan in stage three of the process.200 
   Yet there was one exotic twist to the programme. With the unremitting concern that 
Afghanistan was incompatible with foreign presence, the wider strategy of 'light footprint' 
remained prevalent. Therefore a notion of Afghan 'ownership' materialised at the core of the 
political strategy. Although the agenda would still be set by outsiders, unlike past peacebuilding 
missions, the strategy required “Afghans taking charge of their situation wherever possible”.201 This was an 
ambitious approach to nation-building, particularly given Afghanistan’s political history. 
Nevertheless it was hoped that the political foundations would be laid to ensure that never again 
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would the anarchy of Afghanistan lead to the country becoming a sanctuary for Islamic 
fundamentalism.202 
 
The Bonn Agreement 
     
   On the surface, the political peacebuilding phase in Afghanistan got off to an impressive start. 
At the international negotiations for the interim authority, conducted at Bonn in December 2001, 
many of Afghanistan’s most prominent political figures came together and, after some intense 
negotiations, agreed upon a set of criteria to pave the way for the establishment of an official 
government.203 Given that these discussions took place in the context of intense rivalries 
following decades of civil war, commentators have understandably credited the Bonn process as a 
remarkable feat.204 Gaining any form of consensus among such volatile and hostile parties was a 
noteworthy achievement.  
   Nevertheless, the established criticism of the Bonn process is that it excluded a key participant - 
the Taliban. In this sense, Bonn was a ‘victors only’ guest list and with the Taliban absent yet still 
capable of resurgence, the process did not serve the conflict resolution purpose that it should 
have. This failing was recognised by the pioneer of the negotiation process, Lakhdar Brahimi, 
who himself acknowledged “the Taliban should have been at Bonn. This was our original sin”.205 
Although it is debatable whether the Taliban would have engaged the process, established 
conflict resolution wisdom suggests that without at least an invitation to a major participant the 
process was cursed from the outset.206 
   By the end of December the Bonn agreement had been signed and ratified by the UN.207 At 
least on paper, consensus and cooperation had been achieved. Yet so much of the Bonn 
mediation had been a tactical process to arrive at an immediate resolution.208 Something far more 
substantial would be required to guarantee a lasting political peace. Now the objective became the 
more complex task of creating credible institutions and establishing genuine authority as required 
by phases two and three of the peacebuilding strategy. As the devil’s own luck would have it, this 
coincided with a degenerating security environment. Insurgency in the countryside increased 
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while political rivalries at the centre intensified.209 It soon became clear that the political strategy 
had the necessary tactics to thrash out a government but not the strategic vision to manufacture a 
credible political entity.  
 
A New Constitution 
 
   The new Afghan constitution, which was established on the 3rd November 2003, proved to be 
one of the most modern and democratic to be proposed in a post conflict environment to date. 
The constitution envisaged a strong centralised presidential system, guided by overarching 
democratic principles.210 This was plainly at odds with the socio-political context of Afghanistan, 
a country that is highly undeveloped and has consistently rejected progressive modernisation and 
centralisation. The liberal promises of the new constitution had little contact with reality and only 
served to undermine the fragile political situation by creating irrelevant and implausible goals 
destined for failure and disillusionment. 
   Carol Riphenburg provides a comprehensive analysis on specific aspects of the constitution 
which are flawed. Riphenburg argues that there is a fundamental inconsistency between Islamic 
states and constitutional democracy, a lively debate that continues to engage academics.211 Even if 
the democratic values can be upheld in the immediate term, empirical studies reveal that the long-
term prospects for democratisation are questionable. A study by Enterline and Greig reveals that 
39 percent of weak democracies fail by their tenth anniversary.212 The same authors also 
demonstrate how internal domestic factors such as diversity and pervasive poverty can obstruct 
democratic potential. As a diverse and impoverished country, the outlook for Afghanistan is 
dismal.213 After 40 years, only one of the poorest imposed democratic states remains. Put simply, 
a democratisation success in Afghanistan goes against all the odds. 
   A more systematic concern with the constitution was its centralised design. Ultimately political 
power in Afghanistan does not rest at the state centre. Efforts to centralise authority have rarely 
been met with success throughout Afghanistan’s troubled history. In the few cases where the 
centralised Afghan state has partially functioned, this has only been achieved through ruthless 
means that are entirely undemocratic. As long ago as 1880, Lord Roberts lamented that 
                                                 
209 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, pp.197-199. 
210 ‘The Constitution of Afghanistan’, Afghanistan Online 
<http://www.afghanweb.com/politics/current_constitution.html> [accessed 10 March 2010].  
211 Carol Riphenburg, ‘Afghanistan’s Constitution: Success or Sham?’, Middle East Policy 12:1 (2005), pp.31-43, and 
Charles K. Rowley and Nathanael Smith, ‘Islam’s democracy paradox: Muslims claim to like democracy, so why do 
they have so little?’, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 25:4 (2008), pp.155-157.   











  44 
“Afghanistan should be disintegrated, and that we should not again attempt to place the whole country under any 
one sovereign”.214 Riphenburg writes that the entirely state centric character of the constitution is 
“more a fiction of the international community than a reality”.215 Ignoring the experience of past 
occupations, the political strategy could not conceive of a design outside the realms of the state-
centric model, even though the political design “matches neither the real internal distribution of power in 
Afghanistan nor local notions of legitimacy”.216  
   Nowhere is this better exposed than with the preference for the Afghan Presidential System. In 
order to meet standards for strong centralised government, the strategy preferred a system that 
revolved around a single President.217 Yet Riphenburg cites empirical evidence suggesting that 
Presidential systems produce fragile democratic systems in weak states.218 Other commentators 
have observed that there are too few checks and balances in the Presidential system while it 
excludes locally influential individuals from the political workings.219 For this reason some 
commentators have criticised policy makers for adopting a governmental model that was neither 
accountable nor capable of maintaining national consensus in a highly fragmented political 
environment.220 Therefore despite the landmark of the constitution, unless a strategy existed for 
making this political process function in practice, the constitution would largely prove to be a 




   If the constitution had delighted peacebuilding advocates, the elections of 18th September 2005 
had them positively delirious. An astonishing 7 million Afghans went to the polls and of this 
demographic almost half were female voters. The day was remarkably peaceful and there was not 
even one attack on a polli g station. 
   Nonetheless the elections were not without their critics. Bülent Aras and Şule Toktaş state that 
high levels of coercion, illiteracy and disorganisation ultimately played a major part in 
undermining the validity of the process as well as damaging the image of the new National 
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Assembly in the eyes of ordinary Afghans.221 Inevitably with post conflict environments, the 
process was littered with irregularities involving bribery, intimidation, multiple voting, and the 
stuffing of ballot boxes.222 The Joint Electoral Management Board (JEMB) was forced to exclude 
672 polling stations and 74 ballot boxes from the official count.223 Observers argue that this was 
only a fraction of the actual discrepancies that perforated the election.224 Essentially no matter 
how much the international community wanted to proclaim the election a success, it was largely 
an exercise in building legitimacy. Therefore it was the perceptions of the local Afghans that 
mattered and field research suggests that the irregularities were enough to engender 
disappointment in the eyes of the Afghan people.225  
   The issue at stake is not whether the elections failed, but what purpose they achieved. The 
saying goes that ‘democracies make elections; elections do not make democracies’. Elections in 
themselves were simply a process; by no means did they guarantee a credible political entity at the 
end of it. Both the constitution and the elections gave the impression of political development 
but ultimately they were always going to be an excellent public relations exercise, though not 
enough in themselves to induce genuine political development. As President Karzai himself 
pointed out: “Is it enough to have a constitution? Certainly not! . . . A constitution can be no more than a stack 
of papers”.226 Unfortunately for the nation-building strategy the political structure that emerged 
from elections and the constitution was not one that was able to implement a nation-building 
programme based on legitimacy and institutional capacity. 
 
Political Capital and Capacity 
 
   As any student of nation-building is well aware, even with successful introduction of a new 
constitution and elections, the success rates of nation-building projects is imperfect at the best of 
times.227 Throughout the period 2002-2008, Afghanistan was no exception. In reality, the flagship 
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success stories of the Bonn agreement, the constitution and the elections concealed the fact that 
the actual political situation was desperately unstable and plainly revealed that the notion of a new 
democratic Afghanistan was just a façade. As one senior UN official observed: “We are supporting 
the creation of the appearance of authority in the hope that it leads to the creation of actual authority”.228 In 
achieving this objective, two strategic obstacles stood in the way.  
   The first of these was the political elite that inherited the new Afghan state. Instead of laying 
the foundations for democratic reform, the emphasis on Afghan ownership of the process meant 
that the political characteristics of the new government continued to reflect tribal feudalism 
instead of centralised progressive democracy. Expecting that former belligerents would leave 
behind their incarnations as warlords was highly unrealistic in Afghanistan’s socio-political 
context.229 Subsequently the calibre of the political leadership that emerged was highly dubious. 
Of the elected assembly, 40 members had ties to militias, 17 were active drug smugglers and a 
further 19 had at some stage been accused of committing war crimes.230 Corruption was endemic. 
Practically every position of authority could be haggled for some kind of favour. In 2007 
Afghanistan was rated in the top-ten most corrupt countries globally.231 Despite determined 
rhetoric from Karzai stating the desire to build “a strong, rich, self-sufficient, powerful and lawful 
Afghanistan”232, in reality bad governance and corruption stifled any chances of Karzai achieving 
this ambition. The Afghan government demonstrated neither the capacity nor the resolve to 
address corruption issues.233 As a result the people of Afghanistan became increasingly 
disillusioned.234  
   Paradoxically, even though the strategy had clearly stipulated ‘Afghan ownership’ of the 
political process, this provision was not necessarily shared among the perceptions of the Afghan 
population. As Afghanistan’s political dynamics demonstrated an incompatibility with effective 
governance, local opinions of the U.S. and other international partners suffered as a result. It was 
not long before the traditional anti-colonialist narrative began to prevail over the optimism that 
had temporarily revealed itself after the overthrow of the Taliban. President Karzai was no longer 
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the triumphant saviour of Afghanistan but a ‘puppet’ of his Western guarantors.235 The foreign 
presence in Afghanistan was no longer a relief, it was an occupation. The persistent nationalism 
and opposition to ‘foreign rule’ that has defined Afghanistan’s political history steadily resurfaced.  
   The second issue was the lack of attention given to capacity/institution building. For the highly 
ambitious centralised model to work, an intricate, sophisticated and overreaching administrative 
structure was essential.236 However, with attention diverted to Iraq, and given the “relative 
stinginess”237 of donor funding, the strategy appeared to ignore the requirement for genuine 
capacity building in favour of short-term, high visibility political success stories.  
   The consequence was relative anarchy, with Kabul’s authority existing in name only and local 
warlord power rising to levels at which they became completely unmanageable by the centre.238 
The government’s authority and legitimacy increasingly lost credibility. For nation-building 
analysts like Ignatieff, failing to appreciate the importance of capacity building is a criminal error. 
Ignatieff argues that capacity building is an essential precondition for any structure to succeed 
and should trump even democratic ideals.239 As is recognised by Ignatieff, without the basic 
administrative preconditions of justice and law and order, other democratic processes are 
trivial.240 So long as these conditions remained absent, the nation-building project could not even 
administer, let alone progress. 
   With the Afghan government failing to provide basic services, and its legitimacy severely 
undermined, the Taliban were granted an avenue of opportunity. With Kabul’s authority absent 
in large parts of the countryside, the Taliban capitalised by establishing shadow authorities. This 
issue prevails to this day and in a number of areas the Taliban have been more efficient than the 
government at collecting taxes.241 With the absence of any effective judicial system, Daniel 
Markey writes that in many areas the local population willingly approach the Taliban to adjudicate 
civil disputes.242 For decades the Afghan people have yearned for services and governance. 
Although the Taliban’s methods may be extreme, if the alternative is corruption and anarchy then 
perhaps they are seen as the lesser of two evils?     
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Summary – Political Development 
 
   As the euphoria surrounding the Bonn agreement, elections and constitution wore thin, it soon 
became very apparent that the political element of Afghanistan’s nation-building programme was 
dangerously artificial. The 'light footprint' approach, which placed a heavy emphasis on Afghan 
ownership, played to the strengths of the country’s shady political elite, thereby allowing them to 
manipulate the situation to their own personal benefit and undermine the long-term objective of 
representative, democratic and legitimate government. Furthermore the strategy did not place 
nearly enough emphasis on capacity development. Without capacity, authority was non-existent. 
Without authority, the door was left open to insurgency, crime and other destabilising threats.  
   Regardless of the political strategy that materialised, historically speaking, imposing an effective 
political entity in Afghanistan was always going to be a swim against the prevailing tide. The 
factitious and disorderly characteristics of Afghanistan’s political structure suggested to Enterline 
and Greig that it was "unstable, difficult and above all dangerous" 243 to pursue a democratic Weberian 
agenda in Afghanistan. In reality it was yet another example of nation-builders embarking on the 
grand design of the liberal peacebuilding model with a disregard for the local situation and little 
consideration as to how this would be achieved in practice. Strategists have readily acknowledged 
that in political nation-building “the people want an administration that they understand and relate to”.244 In 
the case of the political strategy employed in Afghanistan, not only was it a foreign creation but it 
was also decadent and crucially failed to meet key stipulations for successful nation-building. As 
with many peacebuilding missions that had preceded Afghanistan, once again the idyllic vision of 
a post conflict liberal democracy had predictably fallen by the wayside.  
 
Objective: Consolidating Security 
 
   As has already been suggested in Part 1 of this dissertation, although the Taliban had been 
overthrown, the security situation towards the end of 2002 was far from stable. Nevertheless, for 
both strategic and practical reasons, the security strategy remained committed to the ‘light 
footprint’ approach. The theory behind this strategy was rooted in the assumption that anything 
more substantial would lead to a military quandary similar to the ones experienced by the British 
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and the Soviets.245 The practical reason for the 'light footprint' strategy was due to the ongoing 
war in Iraq. Regardless of Afghanistan’s security requirements, its relegation to a second tier 
priority meant that there was little feasible alternative other than to establish a security model 
based on limited foreign resources. 246   
   As a consequence of these two factors, the security strategy that emerged was a progeny of the 
one that had preceded it. Foreign troops increased marginally and involved two types of security 
forces. The first were responsible for traditional peacekeeping duties and fell under the banner of 
NATO, making up the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The second was made up 
of predominantly U.S. forces who continued in their counterterrorism operations. Both were 
complemented by aerial support. Meanwhile the vast majority of the security presence on the 
ground was provided by local troops who, with time, would be incorporated into the Afghan 
national security forces - the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police 
(ANP). For those local agents and militias that were not incorporated into national security 
forces, the strategy remained as before and continued to pay off these entities in return for 
loyalty.  
   
Warlords and Militias 
 
   Scholars of ‘nation-building’ will notice a critical inconsistency in this strategy immediately. Past 
experience recommends that a first security priority in a ‘post conflict’ environment is to initiate a 
process of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR).247 The dangers of heavily 
armed lingering militias is identified by UN advisor Barnett Rubin who stated, “Unless [militia 
groups] are either transformed into, or replaced by, legally constituted security services, neither reconstruction nor 
improvement of governance, to say nothing of the more distant goal of democratization, can take place”.248 The 
process of DDR would also gain the support of the local population who had suffered miserably 
under the militias in the past. Without a doubt, disarmament of the warlords was the most 
popular policy of the Taliban and one which the Afghan people were desperate to see repeated 
by the Coalition.249 
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   Yet in absence of international security forces the Coalition had no viable alternative than to 
rely on local militias for some kind of security presence. The implications of this approach 
proved to be counterintuitive to peacebuilding. Ruthless and corrupt, the warlords returned to 
their old ways of terrorising the local population.250 Autonomous and untrustworthy, some 
warlords on the CIA payroll even assisted the insurgency by protecting former Taliban 
commanders.251 Vast inducements, stolen aid money and improvised checkpoints ensured that 
local warlords were considerably wealthier than central government. This was contradictory to 
the political strategy, as it reaffirmed the notion that central authority was weak and irrelevant. As 
a result of empowering local militias the corrupt and defunct warlord system spiralled to a level 
that became completely unmanageable by both the Afghan government and UNAMA.  
   A DDR programme was not initiated until April 2003, well over a year after the fall of the 
Taliban.252 By this time militias and their commanders had consolidated themselves, established 
spheres of control, and had genuine interests to protect. As the security situation further 
deteriorated a ‘security dilemma’ was created between rival militias where groups only felt secure 
by arming themselves against each other, creating a situation of perpetual insecurity.253 As 
anarchy became symptomatic of the security environment, it was logical that the power brokers 
would be individuals that could survive by means of force.  
   Even when the DDR programme was introduced critics argue that it failed to conjure up any 
enticing incentives to persuade militias to reintegrate with the broader society.254 The soaring 
price of opium made it financially prudent for armed groups to ignore reintegration programmes 
in favour of aiding the narcotics trade. Furthermore, Dirk Salomons makes the important point 
that without seductive alternatives the DDR strategy actually facilitated insurgent recruitment by 
creating aggrieved out-of-work militia men. These issues were particularly the case with mid-level 
commanders who were u suitable for incorporation into national political or military structures 
but lived comfortably enough not to be allured by reintegration policies. 255  
   To this day, the strategy towards warlords appears to be as perplexing as ever. Scholars too 
have found themselves puzzled by the simultaneous characterisation of Afghan warlords as both 
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‘villains’ as well as ‘allies’.256 In parts of the country 'warlords' have simply re-branded their 
militias and traded their khaki for well pressed suits, allowing them to masquerade as professional 
private security companies.257 While the behaviour and motivations of these forces varies from 
case to case, it would appear that the sentiment among Western commanders in the field is just as 
mixed. Some are adamant these militias are part of the problem while others see them as crucial 
to stability.258 Whichever argument holds the greatest weight, it is clear that from the very outset 
the strategy towards 'warlords' was notably flawed by its ambiguity and inconsistencies.  
 
Afghan National Forces 
 
   The approach towards Afghan National Forces proved to be more comprehensible. Ultimately 
the scheme was a type of DDR by default. In effect, militias would be disarmed, demobilised, 
integrated into Afghan National forces and then the process would revert by rearming and 
remobilising the same forces under the new brand of Afghan national forces.  
   After a shaky start for the Afghan National Army (ANA), this move has met with notable 
success at the time of writing. Rashid argues that the ANA “has become the single most successful U.S.-
led nation-building exercise in Afghanistan.”259 Recruitment has been rapid and the ANA currently 
stands at above 140,000.260 Steadily the ANA has succeeded in instilling a sense of national pride 
as well as gaining the confidence of the Afghan people at the local level. Many reports in the field 
have been complimentary and capability has steadily improved.261   
   However the situation now is far removed from that in 2003-5. As of February 2004, the ANA 
was only 7,000 strong.262 At the recruit level, the soldiers were of dubious quality - very badly 
paid, mostly uneducated, frequently unfit, and inclined to desertion. Coalition officers spoke of 
the indiscipline and low levels of morale as well as the tendency towards banditry behaviour.263 
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On this basis, the creation of the ANA was at the very least a five-year plan and had no capacity 
to address the short-term security issues.  
    The situation with Afghanistan's National Police (ANP) has been more problematic. 
Observers suggest that the training proved to be rushed, half hearted and ineffective.264 Afghan 
civilians were reported as saying, "Forget about the Taliban, our biggest problems are with the police".265 
Corruption within the ANP became totally endemic, nullifying its utility as a force for law and 
order. A DFID report from 2008 suggested that as many as 50 percent of the ANP were 
involved in illegal narcotics at some level.266 Despite efforts to instigate an effective police force, 
the ANP remained “one of the most dysfunctional institutions in the country”.267      
   As of now, both the ANA and ANP are healthy at least in terms of numbers. Progress has been 
steady, leading Minister of Defence General Azimi, to state publicly that Afghan national forces 
are "strong enough to take charge of security".268 It remains to be seen whether this will be the case 
when foreign forces withdraw from front line combat duties in 2014. Nevertheless, even if this 
assessment is correct, the sustainability of such a force remains a concern for strategists. The 
funding that has backed the ANA and ANP has been unprecedented.269 Relative to GDP, 
Afghanistan's military budget was five times more than countries with even the highest levels of 
military spending.270 Critics have noted that even with a growth rate of 9 percent per annum and 
natural resource extraction improved by 12 percent (both unrealistic forecasts), in ten years’ time 
the domestic revenue of the Afghan government will still only be $2.5 billion. This would mean 
that, even in a decade, the Afghan security forces would cost significantly more than the 
country’s total revenue – hardly a sustainable state of affairs.271 Although international partners 
currently shoulder this burden, supposing foreign interest subsides, the Afghan government will 
be left with an impossible bill to foot.  
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Minimalist, Multilateral, Multidimensional Soldiering 
 
   Insofar as ISAF were concerned, the foreign security presence in Afghanistan had three 
distinctive characteristics. Firstly, the number of foreign forces remained minimal as the strategy 
kept its commitment to the ‘light footprint’ approach. The second characteristic of the foreign 
security presence was its multilateral composition. Whereas the overthrow of the Taliban was 
predominantly orchestrated by local forces in partnership with the U.S., the responsibility for 
‘post conflict’ security was essentially handed over to 7,000 ISAF troops from multiple NATO 
contributing countries.272 The third characteristic of ISAF concerned the diverse and 
multidimensional military activities of the international security forces. On the one hand ISAF 
troops were absorbed in counterterrorist operations by engaging the remnants of al Qaeda and 
the Taliban. On the other hand, troops were also involved in more traditional counterinsurgency 
activities in an attempt to win the ‘hearts and minds’ (WHAM) of the Afghan population.273 This 
was deemed to be achieved by consolidating occupied territory, providing security to local 
populations and enabling reconstruction projects, thereby maintaining a sense of legitimacy with 
the local population and substantiating the new government.274 It was these principal 
characteristics that defined the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan between January 2003 
and October 2008.  
   Firstly, the most palpable inconsistency of the strategy concerns the meagre contribution of 
international forces. By the end of 2002, there were only 8,000 U.S. troops based in Afghanistan, 
all of whom were involved in counterterrorist operations and did not engage in any peacekeeping 
activities.275 Even as late as April 2005, the number of foreign soldiers that were stationed in 
Afghanistan was a mere 18,000, of which only 8,000 were operational peacekeepers.276 In a 
country that had been decimated by decades of insecurity, it was implausible to assume this small 
number of international forces was enough to reverse the conflict cycle and finally stabilise 
Afghanistan. 
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   Rumsfeld publically admitted that "it's not logical to me that it would take as many forces following the 
conflict as it would to win the war".277 However established studies on successful peacekeeping 
missions directly contradict this policy of ‘minimalist soldiering’. Dobbins contends that the 
number of peacekeepers must be ten times as high as the number required for conventional 
fighting in order to maintain stability.278 By Dobbins’ recommendation, the number of troops 
needed in Afghanistan should have been in the hundreds of thousands. Clearly the situation in 
Afghanistan from 2003-8 was a long way from meeting this recommendation. 
   As a consequence, international forces controlled little more than urban areas while the rest of 
the country was left to militias, insurgents and anarchy. With most of the population living in 
isolated rural areas this strategy did not have the operational reach to immunise key 
demographics of the population from insurgency.279 Local people found themselves frequently 
exposed to the insurgents as ISAF troops moved on. This put the local population in an 
impossible position where they were confused over how, or even if, they should cooperate with 
counterinsurgency forces.280  
   Observers have consistently maintained that “you can’t beat a rural insurgency without a rural security 
presence”.281 Yet when ISAF forces ventured into rural territories to clear insurgents, they were left 
isolated in remote areas that were either tactically impossible or strategically irrelevant to hold. 
Consequently the security problems became self perpetuating; as one soldier observed: “We move 
in, hold the ground and then have to move off again. As soon as we do that, the enemy move back in. It’s a cat and 
mouse game and we never really have control… it’s infuriating”.282 Even though international forces rarely 
lost a tactical engagement, one ISAF general admitted in mid-2007 that “NATO and Afghan forces 
control at most 20 percent of the southern provinces”.283 These worryingly honest interpretations from the 
field fully reveal the extent to which ISAF forces were completely inadequate in number to 
extend security across Afghanistan’s dispersed populace and extensive landscape.  
   The second failing of the international strategy was related to the multinational character of 
ISAF and the disjointed and uncoordinated implementation of these forces in practice. With such 
a small number of troops, the tasks and territorial areas of Afghanistan were divided up among 
the NATO Coalition, with one country at a time taking the overarching responsibility of ‘lead 
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nation’. Jones is one commentator who says that "this approach was a disaster".284 The frequent 
changes in the role of 'lead nation' meant there was little continuity. This was worsened by the 
fact that the ‘lead nation’ approach did not stipulate an overarching mandate, leaving military 
operations decentralised under the command of each contributing nation.  
   It was not long before the disjointed command structure began to reveal the different caveats 
amongst NATO countries.285 The operational mandate of contributing countries proved to be 
limited by an unwillingness to risk casualties. Operations were conducted simultaneously without 
coordination while rules of engagement varied enormously. Only in the last two years has the 
German military adjusted its rules of engagement after fervently refusing to commit to combat 
operations.286 Moreover other countries like Spain, France and Italy have all resisted sending 
troops to troublesome regions. This incoherent approach led Canadian Ambassador David 
Sproule to admit that “the national caveats are a source of extraordinary tension within NATO”.287 The 
multilateral approach, theoretically a triumph for NATO, was actually highly flawed in practice 
with major inconsistencies concerning unity of purpose and strategic approach. 
   The third critique of the international forces in Afghanistan is related to the disjointed strategic 
focus of these forces. As far as U.S. troops were concerned, the operational strategy in 
Afghanistan after the overthrow of the Taliban regime was overwhelmingly focused on 
counterterrorism. From the outset Bush conceded he was unwilling to use U.S. troops in the 
event of a Taliban resurgence, telling his advisors “I oppose using the military for nation-building. Once 
the job is done, our forces are not peacekeepers”.288 Instead U.S. forces concentrated on covert surgical 
tactics to combat the remnants of al Qaeda. The shift towards counterinsurgency was more 
accidental than it was a strategic preference. Even as late as 2004 Rumsfeld insisted that 
insurgency was not an issue in Afghanistan.289 It was only until two years after the fall of the 
Taliban regime that the U.S. strategy appeared to acknowledge that insurgency was the principal 
stumbling block to security. The state of denial finally gave way to reality and the security strategy 
began an arduous shift towards counterinsurgency and WHAM.  
   Yet even when the strategy theoretically shifted towards counterinsurgency there was a distinct 
reluctance to facilitate the process in practice. The classic example is the case of Provincial 
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Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).290 The success and failures of the PRTs varied from case to case. 
However, retrospective reports suggest that in general PRTs “provided a positive international 
presence”.291 Yet PRTs also suffered from the issues that had become endemic among ongoing 
security efforts. A USAID report accounts how lack of coordination and national caveats quickly 
revealed themselves in the PRTs as they had done with regular forces. The decentralised PRT 
structure crippled NATO’s capacity to establish an essential strategic purpose to the scheme. The 
report also found that PRTs were ineffective at addressing local security issues such as tribal 
disputes or narcotics trafficking.292 Furthermore, Rashid argues that the quality of some PRT 
forces was dubious. Many were drawn from reservists and lacked the language skills, expertise 
and experience required for such complex and diverse operations.293 The association with aid and 
development also fashioned a new problem in ‘post conflict’ reconstruction where development 
organisations and security forces became indivisible in the eyes of the local population. 
Frequently, NGOs were unwilling to work alongside PRTs for fear that doing so might lead them 
to become associated with the military and tarnish their aura of neutrality, undermine their 
humanitarian spirit, and potentially lead them to becoming targets in the insurgency.294 This 
subverted the effectiveness of the essential relationship between the PRTs and civilian 
organisations. 
   Yet this is not to suggest that the PRT presence was significant enough to combat security 
issues in the first place. The limited number of PRTs, which amounted to a mere 22 at their peak 
in 2005, meant that their work was mostly concentrated in the immediate vicinity of district 
capitals and not in the remote countryside where WHAM was most required.295 Although in 
principal the PRTs were a dynamic instrument for counterinsurgency and winning hearts and 
minds, the case study plainly reveals how the strategy refused to apply the available ‘means’ to 
enable the strategy to meet its objectives. 
   The fourth critique of the international presence in Afghanistan concerns how field tactics 
proved to be contradictory to a counterinsurgency strategy. It is generally accepted that a 
counterinsurgency strategy necessitates protecting the population, thereby winning their support, 
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pacifying the grievances of insurgent-minded individuals and establishing political legitimacy.296 
Although the strategy in Afghanistan eventually assumed counterinsurgency as its credo, it 
discounted these crucial principles in the tactics that were employed.  
   The most blatant contradiction was the overreliance on fire support. Limited security forces on 
the ground, coupled with a fear of casualties, ensured the best means of force protection was 
intense fire power and air support.297 However, by transforming into an insurgency, the exercise 
of these tactical weapons became increasingly challenging. The enemy was no longer 
conventionally massed but instead operated as small mobile units often immersed within the 
general population. Unclear on the radar whether the targets were insurgents, civilians or a herd 
of goats, the whole tactic of long range bombing became far less effective and mistakes began to 
accumulate.298 
   The full strategic impact of collateral damage really came to the fore in July 2002 when a 
wedding party was bombed after indulging in the time honoured Afghan tradition of celebrating 
by firing weapons into the air. The story, but one of many, encouraged a backlash from Afghan 
civilians as well as from the international community.299 As the insurgency gathered momentum 
from 2005 to 2008, the number of air strikes increased significantly.300  In 2008, civilian casualties 
caused by Coalition forces had increased nearly fourfold since the year 2006.301 Over several 
months between 2002 and 2008, the number of civilians killed by ISAF forces was higher than 
those killed by insurgents.302 This has proven desperately damaging to the strategic imperative of 
WHAM.303 
   Scholars and military officials alike both acknowledge that air support can only ever be a 
supplementary tactical tool.304 Senior officers on the ground have recognised that “to win the 
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insurgency, we’re not going to bomb our way out of this”.305 Former supreme commander, General 
Petraeus, also supported this suggestion by claiming “every Afghan civilian death diminishes our 
cause”.306 Furthermore, Erica Gaston argues that the collateral damage involved makes air strikes a 
counter-productive means of fighting an insurgency.307 To support Gaston's argument, reports 
from the field suggest that "often insurgents carry out a terrorist act or guerrilla raid with the primary purpose 
of enticing counterinsurgents to overreact" and turn the population against them.308 As a tactic of the 
insurgents, this appears to be effective: an opinion poll in 2008 revealed that nearly 40 percent of 
Taliban sympathisers were at least partly motivated by the effects of civilian casualties from 
NATO air strikes.309 Other critics such as Robert A. Pape maintain that air attacks are an 
ineffective means of targeting an enemy in the first place.310 The incapacity to decapitate al 
Qaeda's leadership earlier in the campaign is testament to this. Indeed, as T.R. Ferhrenbeck 
observers: “You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life – 
but if you desire to defend it, to protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground…by putting 
your young men into the mud”.311 Whatever the tactical benefits of firepower, the consensus among 
commentators and military professional alike is that the ‘bona fide’ dimensions of an insurgency 
can only be addressed by putting boots on the ground. 
   In summary, the multidimensional, multilateral and minimalist strategy was highly flawed. 
Numerically insufficient, lacking in coherence, strategically inconsistent and tactically 
counterintuitive, the foreign presence made an ineffective contribution to the security situation in 
Afghanistan. With these strategic failings, combined with the internal conflict dynamics of 
Afghanistan, the foundations for an intractable rural insurgency had been laid.  
 
Pakistan’s Safe Havens 
 
   Once the remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban escaped across the border after the Coalition’s 
failed attempt to round them up in the mountainous border regions, any doubts about Pakistan’s 
significance in the Afghan conflict became null and void. The rigid political boundary that carves 
its way through the region has been ignored by local populations ever since the Durand line was 
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first introduced in 1893.312 The border region (formally known as the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas - FATA) is a territory of about 27,500 sq km of thick forests and mountainous 
terrain. This uninviting environment is home to around 3.5 million Pashtuns and 1.5 million 
Afghan refugees. In the FATA, poverty levels are high and conservative Islam is predominant. 
Politically the region has consistently proven itself to be immune to the influence of central 
authority.313 The combination of these factors meant that the FATA provided an ideal ‘safe 
haven’ for displaced Taliban and al Qaeda fighters.314  
   Without a mandate to operate in Pakistan, Coalition forces on the other side of the border were 
helpless in combating these areas and their insurgent occupants. It was widely believed that the 
FATA became the new headquarters for the insurgency and operations centre, whereupon al 
Qaeda and its related groups were able to organise its attacks post 9/11, including the London, 
Madrid and Bali bombings.315 If ever a territorial entity could be described as the heart of Islamic 
terrorism, the FATA became the most compelling candidate. 
   As we have already discussed, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan made a conscious 
u-turn by renouncing the Taliban and offering the U.S. its full support. On the face of it, the 
capture of a few fleeing al Qaeda and Taliban groups suggested that Pakistan was fulfilling its 
pledge.316 President Musharraf and the Pakistani army publically declared that the FATA was a 
terrorist free area.317 In reality this was far from the case. The protected status of the FATA 
region allowed insurgents to use it as a springboard for attacks across the border and then return 
to safety.318 As one U.S. marine was quoted as saying, “The Taliban sanctuary…is catastrophic for 
us…Taliban fighters get strategic and operational guidance from across the border, as well as supplies and technical 
components for their improvised explosive devices”.319 As a result of this critical factor, there is widespread 
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agreement among analysts that the safe havens in Pakistan were crucial in enabling the Taliban’s 
resurgence.320 
   Looking beyond the smoke and mirrors, it was probably unrealistic to expect Islamabad’s 
dramatic shift at the official level to be reflected in the field where ISI and Pakistani forces had 
assisted and worked alongside Islamist fighters as partners for decades.321 While the U.S. and her 
allies were determined to rid the region of militant fundamentalism, by contrast Pakistan 
historically colluded with these groups as strategic assets in the conflict with India.322 With a new 
government in Kabul, India was gifted with unprecedented strategic opportunities to elevate 
themselves as a principal regional player and pressurise Pakistan from a second front.323 After 
years of sponsoring the Mujahedeen against the Taliban, largely in vain, India was finally granted 
its strategic opening. As far as Pakistan was concerned, the U.S. had effectively “handed the keys of 
Kabul to India’s proxies”.324    
   Seemingly oblivious to this complex regional dilemma, the strategy did little to alter the 
fundamental calculus of the Pakistani security concerns. India was instantly allowed to make its 
presence in Afghanistan known with multiple investments in numerous infrastructure and 
reconstruction projects that stretched up to the border of Pakistan.325 As India’s influence in 
Kabul grew, so too did Pakistan’s unease, while the international community remained largely 
apathetic.326  
   Instead of addressing these developments, U.S. strategy opted to avoid the political minefield 
of the India-Pakistan conflict entirely and instead adopt a policy of dehyphenation, seeking to 
engage with both India and Pakistan autonomously “without becoming hostage to the vicissitudes of 
Indian-Pakistani relations”.327 Yet whatever increased dialogue can be achieved through 
dehyphenation, critics note that unless the structural issues are addressed, essentially it can only 
accomplish superficial diplomatic gestures.328 The narrative surrounding the India-Pakistan 
conflict has been formulated for the better part of a century ensuring that the most rudimentary 
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of trust is totally absent.329 Steven Coll argues that the consequence of this is that both India and 
Pakistan hold “unshakable assumptions about the other’s proclivity for dirty tricks”.330 U.S. strategists were 
at best naïve and at worst overtly conceited to assume Pakistan would abandon its long-term 
security concerns in order to confront the enemy of America. 
   In this context, from the spring of 2002 until 2007 Pakistan’s efforts in the ‘War on Terror’ 
became increasingly futile. The practical implications were calamitous to security efforts. From as 
early as 2002, U.S. officers complained that Pakistani Frontier Corps were helping al Qaeda cross 
the border by providing them with support fire. Meanwhile reports suggested that ISI operatives 
continued to assist and work alongside insurgents independent of Islamabad.331  
   The pressure mounted to the extent that in mid-march 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
supposedly gave Musharraf an ultimatum; either clear terrorism from the FATA or the U.S. 
military would carry out the task instead.332 By the end of March 2004, Musharraf’s commitment 
to the FATA region stepped up a gear. However the results were still unimpressive. In an 
offensive in 2004, the troops sent in to tackle the insurgents were the Frontier Corps and not the 
regular army. Poorly trained and with a tendency towards desertion they were hardly the 
professional outfit required for dealing with a formidable foe and gruelling insurgency. Even with 
additional troops sent throughout the course of 2005-6 the Pakistani effort was half-hearted at 
best and therefore it is of little surprise that the outcome was a military stalemate. The Pakistani 
troops occupied the central administrative hubs but were unwilling to venture out of their bases, 
thereby allowing the insurgents to tighten their grip on the rural population and continue their 
movements into Afghanistan with relative ease. 333  
   To make matters worse, much to Washington’s horror, Pakistani commanders entered into 
numerous deals with the insurgents. The consequences of negotiated ceasefires were predictable; 
while the insurgents temporarily suspended their attacks on Pakistani forces, they were given a 
free reign to launch incursions into Afghanistan to take on ISAF. 334 As a consequence of these 
events, from the period 2002-2006, insurgent and terrorist groups in the FATA continued to 
operate, relatively unimpeded.  
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   Although it was self evident to commentators, policy makers and ground troops that “stabilizing 
Pakistan is a prerequisite to stabilising Afghanistan”,335 the strategy in Afghanistan did not reflect this 
reality. For five years, the strategy appeared to be relatively nonchalant with the Coalition simply 
assuming Pakistan would confront the insurgents residing in the FATA. In a press conference in 
2006, Bush made his support of Musharraf very public, stating, "When the president looks me in the 
eye and says…that there won't be a Taliban and won't be Al Qaeda, I believe him".336 Yet while Bush 
publically reinforced his trust in Pakistan, the increasing scale of the insurgency made it clear to 
observers that the failure to appreciate the significance of Pakistan and the wider regional 
dimensions had played the greatest part in undermining the entire counterinsurgency effort to 
date.337 In the face of glaringly obvious links between the insurgency’s revival and Pakistan, it 
took until the winter of 2007-8 before the FATA dimension was given strategic prioritisation.338    
 
Summary – Consolidating Security 
 
   For many observers, the failure to ensure a comprehensive security strategy was a significant 
factor behind the collapse of the entire nation-building programme for Afghanistan.339 As Dirk 
Salomons wrote: "Without the prospect of security there is no hope".340 Above, four strategic dimensions 
have been outlined which ensured the strategy was inadequate in addressing the security situation 
in Afghanistan during this phase.  
   The first issue was the ad-hoc improvised approach in dealing with local warlords and militias. 
Although the strategy involved a DDR programme, as used in classic peacebuilding strategies, the 
design was faulty and failed to entice former combatants to lay down arms. Furthermore, in 
contradiction of the DDR approach, the 'light footprint' necessitated that militias and warlords 
were utilised as informal security forces. 
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   Secondly, although Afghan National forces are now impressive in number and increasingly 
more capable, they were inadequate at providing security in the short term. The fact that major 
apprehensions over the credibility and capacity of Afghan Forces still remain suggests that 
effective local 'ownership' of the security was never going to be enough to establish stability in 
the case of a complex insurgency in the short term. 
   Thirdly, foreign troops might have made a positive contribution to the security situation. 
However, ISAF were misdirected, uncoordinated and too small in number to constructively 
enforce security. In an insurgency the consequence of perpetual insecurity is that the 
counterinsurgents slowly lose the hearts and minds of the population.341 This situation was 
worsened by the tactical reliance on deadly fire support which perpetuated grievances when it was 
misdirected and tarnished the image of foreign troops in the eyes the Afghan people. When all 
these factors were combined, it revealed a strategy that was at odds with principles of 
counterinsurgency and WHAM.342   
   Finally, this section analysed the futile attempt to construct a regional strategy to confront the 
‘safe havens’ in Pakistan. Insurgents had found a welcome retreat from which they were able to 
enter Afghanistan, fight and retire, as though it was a routine commute. The U.S. failed to rouse 
Pakistan into confronting the FATA region by demonstrating either a lack of understanding or 
an unwillingness to address the wider regional issues by which Pakistan’s security concerns are 
held hostage.  
   Many of these issues remain pervasive today. There continues to be an incoherent strategy with 
regard to warlords and their militias while the debate over the capacity of the ANA to take the 
lead role in the security effort has become one of, if not the, most critical concern for 
commentators. Furthermore, success in Afghanistan remains entirely dependent on Pakistan’s 
efforts to confront domestic militancy, and a degenerative security environment in the north-west 
of the country does little to instil much hope in that regard. The debate between counterterrorism 
and counterinsurgency continues to be hotly contested while the fragile balance between fire 
support and collateral damage, although better managed, remains a careful balancing act.343 Even 
as the strategy for Afghanistan has been prioritised and adapted, some of these issues continue to 
challenge commentators and policy makers alike.  
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Objective: Social Development 
 
   Aid and development as a tool of U.S. foreign policy has been a customary aspect of nation-
building strategy ever since the Marshall Plan following the end of World War II.344 In 
Afghanistan the logic was no different. As Bush publically stated, ''We fight against poverty because 
hope is an answer to terror''.345 Just as the Marshall plan had been fashioned to prevent social, 
economic or political fallout after the destruction of the War in Europe, in Afghanistan the aid 
and development efforts were focused on reversing conditions in an environment that had 
become conducive to terrorism.  
   In order to achieve the desired progress, it was recognised that significant donor support would 
be required. However, in line with the ‘light footprint’ approach, the documents outlining the aid 
and development strategy were “peppered with the language of ownership”346 in the hope that improved 
socio-economic development would legitimise the new government. A strategy combining 
international assistance with local implementation was set out in an ambitious plan to develop 
Afghanistan.  
   On the 21st January 2002, sixty countries came together in Tokyo to discuss the reconstruction 
project in Afghanistan. The magnitude of the development tasks made the project a daunting 
prospect. War had ravaged the cities and shattered most of the infrastructure. Public services 
were effectively non-existent. Drought had wrecked the limited agricultural production. Only a 
quarter of the population had safe water, one in eight had adequate sanitation and one in fifteen 
had electricity.347 The socio-economic situation in Afghanistan was drastic indeed. The initial 
predictions were that Afghanistan would require an estimated $1.7 billion in aid for the first year, 
$10.2 billion for the next five years and $14.6 billion for the next ten years.348 These were 
intimidating figures that would require a significant commitment. However, it was soon self-
evident that the 'light footprint' approach and the shift in focus to Iraq would mean that the aid 
and development strategy in Afghanistan would not be given this capacity to pull Afghanistan out 
of destitution. 
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Early Progress  
 
   This is not to suggest that aid and development efforts in Afghanistan over this period did not 
experience any successes. Under the ‘Back-to-School’ programme, over 4,000 new schools were 
opened between 2002 and 2010.349 It is now estimated that well over seven million Afghan 
children (boys and girls) are able to attend schools, a noteworthy improvement from 2001 where 
enrolment was merely two million (only boys).350 In economic development, a major achievement 
was the creation of a new and stable currency. The new ‘Afghani’ was backed by the U.S. Federal 
Reserve and was valued at 50 Afghanis to $1, a noteworthy improvement on the previous 48,000 
Afghanis to $1. Lockhart argues that this important development initiated an epoch of 
progressive economic reform from 2002 to 2004.351 There were also considerable successes in the 
distribution of humanitarian aid.352 Reports have revealed how humanitarian aid played a major 
role in ensuring the wellbeing of thousands of Afghans struggling in abject poverty and how 
emergency food programmes saved vast numbers from starvation.353 In providing the most basic 
levels of what is popularly termed ‘human security’, approximately five million Afghan refugees 
living abroad were able to return with the assistance of international humanitarian relief 
agencies.354  
   With these somewhat isolated success stories in education, macroeconomic reform and 
humanitarian relief, on the surface the aid and development project in Afghanistan had got off to 
a steady start. Furthermore these achievements are worth mentioning as they reveal that there 
was potential for the Afghan aid and development undertaking to have a positive impact. 
However, beyond this the aid and development strategy was notably lacking in anything more 
long term or institutional.  
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Operational Failings of Aid and Development 
 
   Bearing in mind the dire socio-economic state of affairs in Afghanistan, it should have been 
clear that genuine development could not be achieved by simply addressing the humanitarian 
crisis and initiating very basic aid programmes. Yet Rashid argues this was the style of 
reconstruction that Washington favoured.355 Similar to the approach to political peacebuilding, it 
seems that easily perceptible ‘quick fix’ solutions were used to impart an impression of progress 
that would act as a catalyst for nation-building in general.356 However, not enough thought was 
devoted to long-term projects that would encourage the growth of sustainable institutions, 
stimulate the local economy and move Afghanistan towards a degree of self sufficiency. In the 
rush to achieve swift implementation of short-term projects, the foundations for long-term 
development were frequently undermined.   
   Instead of reinforcing the legitimacy of the fragile new government by providing ‘ownership’ of 
aid and development as stipulated in the 'light footprint' approach, the strategy actively 
contradicted this aim.357 Of money that was pledged at the Tokyo agreements, around $700 
million went to UN agencies while a mere $100 million went to the Afghan administration.358 The 
consequence was that the development of Afghan institutions remained largely dormant. The 
most notorious example of this is the failure to create a credible justice system, deemed by many 
scholars to be a fundamental pre-requisite to nation-building.359 By 2006, a World Bank report 
found that the justice system in Afghanistan was ranked in the bottom five percent of the 
world.360  
   Furthermore, Rashid argues that neglecting the construction of roads was a major strategic 
error.361 Road infrastructure was essential in enabling Afghanistan to re-establish itself as a trading 
nation between Asia and the subcontinent. The construction of roads would also have political 
benefits by enabling the Kabul government to extend its influence into the anarchic peripheries 
of the country. As one U.S. general put it; “where the road ends, the Taliban begins”.362 
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   To undermine government capacity further, the few high-quality local workers were quickly 
snatched up by NGOs instead of being channelled towards local enterprises. Ashraf Ghani, the 
Minister of Finance, lamented that within six months of starting his job in the ministry “[his] best 
people had been stolen by international aid organizations who could offer them forty to a hundred times the salary 
[the Afghan government] could”.363 Not unconnected with this was the extensive employment of 
foreign workers in preference of locals. The rationale behind using foreign workers was again 
stimulated by the need for immediate results but this made no contribution to long-term local 
skill development or lowering unemployment. Perhaps most startlingly, some scholars estimate 
that through this approach almost 40 percent of aid returned to donor countries in the form of 
salaries and corporate profits.364 Other more critical assessments state that a mere 10 percent of 
the aid money that went into Afghanistan actually made it to the population with the rest being 
lost in administration, logistics and corruption.365 
   In order to implement localised projects, aid and development agencies were encouraged to 
form partnerships with local warlords, further undermining the credibility and authority of the 
central government in Kabul. Once projects were completed, they fell under the control of the 
district warlord and some opportunistically used this to entrench their legitimacy and gain 
substantial incomes. One estimate suggests that this deprived the government of around 84 
percent of its anticipated annual revenues.366 Association with warlords also meant that 
development became entangled with corruption and the negative stigma with which warlords 
were associated.  
   The evidence outlined above suggests that implementation of aid and development was directly 
contradictory to the strategic notion of Afghan 'ownership'. Aid experts consistently maintain 
that the “recipient government should be in the driver’s seat”.367 However in the case of Afghanistan, it 
was the development agencies at the wheel, with warlords along for the ride, and central 
government barely a passenger. Under these circumstances the aid and development strategy fell 
at the first hurdle. The strategy invested in short-term projects but was insufficient in kickstarting 
the local economy, developing institutions and human skills or providing credibility to the new 
government.  
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   The second issue with the aid and development strategy was the inability to meet the demands 
of the Afghan people. In essence the aid and development strategy was intimately linked to the 
strategy of WHAM. With development projects in post-conflict societies, nurturing satisfaction 
within the perceptions of the local recipients is surely essential to avoid conflict reviving.368 In this 
sense the aid and development commitments had to deliver. As Ignatieff writes; “the Afghans heard 
the promises. Now they are waiting for the money”.369  
   The commitments made in Japan were hugely optimistic and perhaps this inflated Afghan 
expectations to unrealistically high levels.370 Although development organisations might 
pronounce relative successes in Afghanistan comparative to the low base level, essentially there 
are several reasons why this sentiment is not shared among the local population. The helpful 
micro study by Antonio Donini reveals this enormous disconnect between how the aid agencies 
perceived success compared to the local Afghans.371 From an empirical perspective, in many ways 
the Afghan cynicism is wholly justified. Unemployment consistently remained around 40 percent 
and by 2005 only a mere six percent of the population had access to power from the electricity 
grid.372 In terms of perception, many believed that aid was not in line with their actual needs, 
whilst some complained that its distribution discriminated against certain ethnic groups.373 
Another study of the aid and development programme discovered that the principal beneficiaries 
of aid were actually the ‘urban elite’ and not the rural poor to whom it should have been 
targeted.374 With perhaps the exception of education, basic services failed to reach the Afghan 
rural population. So long as the most basic expectations failed to be met, in the minds of the 
locals, that would be enough to tarnish the operation. 
   Underpinning the devotion to short-term strategies and a failure to meet perceptions, the third 
failing of the aid and development strategy is the most incriminating; the lack of commitment. 
The scale of the neglect is evidently visible in comparison to the reconstruction effort in Iraq. In 
his request to the treasury, Bush asked for $20 billion for Iraq but only $1.2 billion for 
Afghanistan.375 This plainly reveals how Afghanistan had been put “on the back burner in 
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Washington”.376 Other foreign donors were no better at meeting their promises. Up to 2008 only 
$15 billion of the $25 billion promised to Afghanistan had been delivered. The bulk of this 
shortfall fell in the crucial period for reconstruction.377  
   This was contradictory to all maxims of post-conflict reconstruction. Experts with the RAND 
organisation predicted that the minimum figure required to stabilise post conflict countries was 
$100 per capita.378 In Afghanistan, the figure only came to $57.379 Subsequently, even with the 
correct projects specifically directed at meeting Afghan needs, the development undertaking for 
Afghanistan would never be given the crucial capacity to begin the process of hauling the country 
out of the misery of enduring conflict. 
   These three failings - the lack of long-term development projects, the failure to meet 
perceptions, and the critical lack of commitment - meant that not only did the strategy contradict 





   It is appropriate at this juncture to look at a specific dynamic of the Afghan conflict. Although 
predominantly a socio-economic issue, the narcotics problem is the ultimate crosscutting issue, 
provoking both security and political consequences as well. Studies of narcotics and conflict 
plainly reveal that although narcotics “have no link to conflict initiation…they are positively correlated with 
conflict duration”.380 Afghanistan is an archetypal example.  
   In Afghanistan, poppy production increased practically every single year since the invasion in 
2001.381 In the dejected economy of Afghanistan, opium is the stand out product and the 
“mainstay of the rural economy”.382 Its consequences are felt beyond the borders of Afghanistan as it 
is estimated that around 93 percent of the world’s illicit opium trade can be traced back to 
Afghanistan.383  
                                                 
376 Rashid, Descent into Chaos, p.185. 
377 ‘Major Donors Failing Afghanistan Due to $10 Billion Aid Shortfall’, Oxfam (25 March 2008) 
<http://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/pressreleases/major-donors-failing-afghanistan-due-to-10-billion-aid-
shortfall/?searchterm=None> [accessed 27 October 2010]. 
378 James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik and Anga 
Timilsina, The UN’s Role in Nation-building: From the Congo to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005). 
379 Ibid,  p.239. 
380 Svante E. Cornell, ‘Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30 
(2007), p.208. 
381 Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, p.193.  
382 ‘DFID Understanding Afghanistan: Strategic Conflict Assessment’, DFID (November 2008).  











  70 
   The majority of commentators have observed that narcotics have played a considerable role in 
the worsening security situation. Lieutenant General Sir Richard Shirreff argues that “the trade is 
supporting terrorism and insurgency”.384 According to Afghan intelligence, a massive 30 percent of 
Taliban income comes from narcotic related commerce.385 On this basis, it might be reasonable 
to assume that crop extermination is a security necessity. For this reason, some commentators 
like Jones identify the benefits of a tough approach to narcotics production.386 Conversely, other 
observers have stated that in a country where 70 percent live below the poverty line, it is 
strategically counterintuitive to deprive the population of the only consistent source of income.387 
Practically speaking, there are also major structural obstacles to narcotics eradication. Shirreff 
notes how “there are many in the Afghan government who make their money from the narcotics trade and 
therefore have an interest in its continuity”.388 As this reveals, the narcotics issue in Afghanistan is 
hugely complex and requires a carefully considered strategy. 
   However, the counter-narcotics strategy has dithered on taking a concrete position. Initially 
Rumsfeld refused to acknowledge that the narcotics trade was even an issue.389 However in the 
face of soaring production, the U.S. strategy shifted towards eradication.390 This strategy was 
fervently opposed by the U.K. and Afghan government who preferred a more lenient 
approach.391 Other NATO troops operating in drug producing regions decided to adopt an 
entirely neutral stance in relation to the narcotics trade.392 The perplexing evolution of a non-
strategy continued. Yet even when the strategy has more convincingly shifted towards eradication 
followed by crop replacement schemes, reports from the field suggest that farmers continue to 
grow narcotics relatively unimpeded.393    
   This issue merits more lengthy discussion than there is space for here; nonetheless there is 
general consensus that the strategy of laissez-faire towards narcotics has expanded the criminal 
industry and served the insurgent cause.394 The decision not to destroy the crop in order to avoid 
undermining the rural economy may well have been strategically prudent in the short term; 
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however allowing the industry to explode without even a hint of management, or regulation, is a 
wholly different matter.  
 
Summary – Social Development 
 
   The aid and development contribution to nation-building has a reputation of being perhaps the 
most virtuous component in the contentious discourse of interventionism. The current paradigm 
presupposes that rich countries must at least attempt to pull ‘failed states’ out of abject poverty. 
Mass protests, concerts and pressure groups reveal how the Western public has become 
overwhelmingly energetic in embracing philanthropy on an international scale. While this might 
discourage many in the public domain from publically criticising aid work, there are a number of 
commentators who question the grand strategic assumptions of aid and development 
programmes.395 
   Many of the issues facing Afghanistan that are identified above are symptomatic of aid and 
development’s failings in general. In a country that has rarely experienced effective governance it 
seems like strategic suicide not to prioritise the empowerment of local institutions for the long 
term. Yet after the overthrow of the Taliban, the post conflict strategy reverted to auto pilot as 
the aid agencies rolled in and took the reins while the Afghan government watched from the 
sidelines. A significant portion of the sparing aid that did make it to the government was 
frequently lost in the corruption and incompetence that is indicative of a ‘failing state’. This 
recurring balance between local ownership and aid effectiveness continues to be a strategic 
quandary facing the sector – unfortunately Afghanistan was no exception. 
   As Ghani and Lockhart observe, “Good intentions are wasted without positive effects”.396 This is very 
true, but even positive effects may also be wasted without local acknowledgement of progress. 
Aid agencies might be able to manufacture positive statistics, however the real opinions that 
mattered in a WHAM campaign were those of the local people. The evidence suggests that the 
Afghans were disillusioned and frustrated by the inadequacy of the aid strategy. As a result, the 
political legitimacy of the foreign presence and the Afghan government gradually deteriorated.  
   The final critique of the aid and development strategy is the most damning - the lack of 
commitment. When considering past interventions the contributions of donors in Afghanistan 
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was measly by comparison. Afghanistan was one of the most destitute countries on the planet. 
Considering the scale of the development challenges facing the country, a dispassionate strategy 
lacking in attention and resources was strategically inexplicable.  
    
Conclusion – ‘Steadfast in our purpose, now we press on’ 
 
   As the nation-building strategy in Afghanistan 2002-2008 reveals; naivety, and neglect can 
breed great mischief. As can be seen, the strategy of 'light footprint', although rooted in a logical 
reading of history, was not intensive enough to facilitate the nation-building model in 
Afghanistan. By 2007, a National Security Council assessment of the war revealed that the 
strategic objectives set for Afghanistan had not been met.397 By the end of 2007, it became 
increasingly clear to many observers that Afghanistan was "on the edge".398  
   Broadly speaking, the 'light footprint' approach never had the potential to yank Afghanistan out 
of the perennial conflict spiral. These issues became even harder to tackle in the wider context of 
the strategic prioritisation of the war in Iraq. As the situation in Iraq worsened, the U.S. felt that 
Iraq had become the principal security concern while Afghanistan simply became the ‘the other 
war’.399 The strategy of the U.S. at this stage is most appropriately summed up by Admiral 
Michael Mullen, chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff, who told US congress: “In Iraq, we do what 
we must…In Afghanistan, we do what we can”.400 Given Afghanistan’s complicated structural issues, 
this approach was simply not enough. It remains unclear as to whether a different strategy would 
have been enough to nip the insurgency in the bud and allow nation-building to enjoy a rare 
success. Nevertheless, it is indisputable that shifting resources elsewhere, ignoring established 
peacebuilding recommendations and failing to address the anatomic components of the country 
all contributed to the rapid deterioration of the intervention in Afghanistan. 
   There were also wider negative implications caused by the controversy over the war in Iraq. 
The overwhelming support for the intervention that had united the international community, and 
even the Afghans themselves, was now a distant memory. The uncompromising and brutish 
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unilateralism that steered U.S. grand strategy over this period had drastically altered the narrative. 
Few in the international community became willing to join Bush’s clique and "the global wave of 
sympathy that engulfed the United States after 9-11 [had] given way to a global wave of hatred of American 
arrogance and militarisation".401 The ongoing difficulties experienced in Iraq, the widely disputed 
legitimacy of the intervention, a disdain for international treaties, and a hostile attitude towards 
what many saw as an overt contempt for democracy and the rule of law meant that the U.S. now 
found itself considered the greatest threat to international peace in some surveys.402 It was 
reflective of a devastating political consequence – America had become ostracised by the 
international community.403  
   The strategy had also been one which was entirely monopolised by the notion of ‘terror’. 
However, many in the international community felt that al Qaeda was ‘small fry’ alongside 
broader issues such as HIV/AIDS, pervasive global poverty, and longstanding intractable 
conflicts that made a significantly larger contribution to the global fatality register. Yet, all of 
America’s foreign policy issues had become measured within the confines of the ‘War on Terror’. 
Critics suggested that this overemphasis had such a throttlehold on the Bush administration that 
that the response had become hugely disproportionate to the actual threat.404 
   Yet even in terms of addressing the key issue of terrorism, the grand strategy fell far from the 
mark. It is widely acknowledged that a principal reason Islamic fundamentalism turned on the 
U.S. was because it assumed America was hostile to Islam.405 Despite the nominal public relations 
visit to a Mosque, there was very little in the U.S. grand strategy to dispel this assumption. 
Furthermore, after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq quickly became an operational front 
for al Qaeda; somewhat ironic considering that there was limited evidence to suggest any notable 
presence of Islamic fundamentalism prior to the invasion. In addition, even though a major 
terrorist attack has yet to successfully take place on American soil since 9/11, noteworthy attacks 
have occurred in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Britain, Spain, India, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, 
Indonesia and of course Pakistan, suggesting at least that the intervention in Afghanistan has 
done little to thwart the international reach of Islamic fundamentalism. 
   Furthermore, the tactics employed by the administration did little to negate the ‘clash of 
civilisations’. In one instance, Bush went so far as to invoke the use of the term ‘crusade’ as a 
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reference to the ‘War on Terror’.406 When combined with a foreign policy that plainly targeted the 
Muslim world, Bush’s confrontational rhetoric which was designed to rouse American spirits, was 
just as effective at mobilising potential jihadists. Across the Islamic world, one poll dated in 2003 
revealed that overwhelming majorities believed that Osama bin Laden would ‘do the right thing’, 
whereas the same poll showed that a low proportion of Muslims had any confidence in Bush.407 
Figures on terrorist recruitment are nearly impossible to quantify. Nevertheless a number of 
commentators have argued that the 'War on Terror' has actually made the West less cosseted 
from terrorism and underpinned the global insurgency against Western governments.408 
   It was within this context that the intervention into Afghanistan descended into turmoil, 
accompanied by an ignominy courtesy of the wider grand strategy. Both domestically and 
internationally, the 'War on Terror' with its strategic emphasis on preventative self defence had 
taken a mauling and the intervention in Afghanistan became guilty by association. As Bush’s 
second term reached its summation, the critics of the strategy had gathered like vultures. While 
some suggested that Afghanistan would remain on a permanent state of "life support",409 others 
were even less optimistic, asserting bluntly that "for the United States, the war in Afghanistan has been 
lost".410 While the Iraq conflict eventually began to subside towards the beginning of 2007, it 
became apparent that the real battle for Afghanistan was only just beginning. 
*** 
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   The objective of this dissertation was to identify the principal strategic critiques of the 
intervention in Afghanistan between October 2001 and October 2008. By clarifying the key 
arguments, observers can begin to comprehend how strategic shortfall has ensured that the 
conflict in Afghanistan perseveres to this day. The intervention in Afghanistan has indeed 
become an ‘Enduring Nightmare’ and when searching for the empirical reasoning behind this, 




   The distinguished historian of the inter war period, Professor A. J. P. Taylor, when asked if one 
could learn from history, replied, “Like most of those who study history [we learn] from the mistakes of the 
past how to make new ones”.411 Many of the issues the Coalition has faced in Afghanistan could have 
been predicted with a most basic reading of history. The inhospitable landscape, the ongoing 
failure to create a functioning state, the obstacles posed by a highly militarised society and the 
fierce resolve of the local people to resist all invaders – are just a few examples of Afghanistan’s 
structural and historical issues that have perplexed strategists since Alexander the Great and have 
been reborn in a modern form to confront the U.S. and her allies. Afghanistan has earned a 
deserved reputation as the ‘Graveyard of Empires’, a strategic factor which surpasses all other 
considerations.   
   As if Afghanistan’s troubled history was not enough to discourage intervention, then the 
wretched legacy of nation-building and counterinsurgency elsewhere should have been sufficient. 
Enterline and Greig argue that only two genuine success stories have graduated from the school 
of nation-building since 1945.412 Furthermore, statistics suggest that even though 
counterinsurgents seldom lose a tactical engagement, counterinsurgency has an alarming record 
for failure.413 With Afghanistan, the U.S and their international partners selected one of the most 
challenging environments to conduct counterinsurgency and nation-building to date.  
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   The strategists apprehensively brushed aside such cautionary thoughts and descended on 
Afghanistan. The minimalist strategy, termed the ‘Afghan Model’, successfully achieved the 
objective of overthrowing the Taliban government. However the same strategy was inadequate at 
meeting the second objective of defeating al Qaeda forces in the field and eradicating all traces of 
the former regime. As Winston Churchill famously observed: “However beautiful the strategy, you 
should occasionally look at the results.” On the surface the regime was gone, but the Taliban vestiges 
that survived the initial onslaught waited patiently in their safe havens and then returned to 
Afghanistan to settle the scores while the Coalition strategy remained fatally stagnant. 
   With the initial objective of regime change achieved, the strategy shifted its attention towards 
post-conflict reconstruction. However the U.S. administration opposed the idea of full scale 
nation-building, favouring instead a ‘lite’ or minimalist footprint. Both the political design and the 
aid and development strategy were short term in outlook, favouring high impact projects to the 
detriment of genuine long-term development, institution building and generating political capital. 
Driven by traditional nation-building objectives, the strategy was naively committed to 
extraordinarily ambitious targets that the deficient Afghan political system and intractable social-
economic status quo refused to allow. This strategic miscalculation disheartened the local 
population and, coupled with a deteriorating security environment, the strategy fatally began to 
lose the hearts and minds of the Afghan people.  
   Undermining this whole process was the incessant lack of security. An unwillingness to commit 
large-scale international peacekeepers and the inadequacy of local Afghan national forces left a 
security vacuum in the country that was quickly filled by multifaceted threats that varied from 
local warlords to drug barons, insurgents to terrorists. Simultaneously, the strategy critically failed 
to realise the significance of the ‘safe havens’ established in the FATA. With only a token 
international security presence in Afghanistan, and unable to rouse Pakistan into confronting the 
domestic threat it harboured in its western provinces, insurgency waltzed into Afghanistan to 
become a pandemic throughout the countryside. As the security situation degenerated at a serious 
pace, it became clear that the ‘light footprint’ operational strategy simply was too ethereal for the 




   Just as some strategists after the rapid collapse of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein were 
tempted to proclaim U.S. grand strategy a resounding success, commentators would be well 
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unmitigated failure. The long-term implications of such a revolutionary strategy are likely to have 
effects for many years to come and the full understanding of the consequences will be best 
judged by greater hindsight. Nevertheless, to date there are three prominent criticisms of the 
strategy that have come to light. 
   The first of these was that the operational strategy in Afghanistan suffered as a consequence of 
the intervention into Iraq and the wider ‘War on Terror’. Much of the logic behind the decision 
to use a ‘light footprint’ was necessary because Iraq had soaked up resources and shifted 
attention away from Afghanistan. As the situation in Iraq worsened, Afghanistan was relegated to 
a second tier priority as it became increasingly apparent that the U.S. ‘grand strategy’ had 
horrifically over-extended itself. Although far from being in the clear, whereas Iraq appears to be 
pulling itself out of the abyss, it would be fair to say this was achieved at the expense of 
Afghanistan - the country that truly bears the scars of this particular miscalculated hubris. 
   Secondly, even if the ‘War on Terror’ had remained limited to Afghanistan, it is implausible that 
the intervention in itself could have made anything more than symbolic contribution to the wider 
strategy of counterterrorism. The intervention in Afghanistan and the eradication of al Qaeda’s 
training camps were designed to destroy the organisation, but it merely amounted to the ‘strategic 
containment’ of the traceable infrastructure.414 Islamic fundamentalism is predominantly an 
asymmetric ideological movement without clearly identifiable command structure, geographical 
location or military hardware. Strategic targeting of such an enemy is challenging in the first 
instance and responding conventionally to an enemy that was entirely irregular is a strategy that 
was unlikely to yield definitive success. In yearning to deliver a discernable counter punch, the 
U.S. ignored one of Sun Tzu’s key strategic principals: “If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every 
victory gained you will also suffer a defeat”.415 Realising that the U.S. strategy misunderstood the nature 
of its enemy, it is wholly unsurprising that the threat of Islamic terrorism is as real today as it was 
on the eve of intervention.  
   Thirdly, if the intervention in Afghanistan was an inappropriate means of combating Islamic 
fundamentalism, the wider ‘War on Terror’ was seemingly counterproductive. A conflict against a 
multinational threat by its very nature necessitated international cooperation, nowhere more so 
than in the Muslim world. However, the ‘War on Terror’ possessed a conceited unilateralism that 
marginalised allies instead of encompassing them. Alongside allegations of human rights abuses, a 
disdain for international law, and the questionable legitimacy of the Iraq intervention, the 
narrative drastically altered as the global sympathy which arose in the aftermath of 9/11 became a 
distant memory. For bin Laden and his allies, the U.S. grand strategy graciously reinforced some 
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of their key arguments and perpetuated Islamic grievances against the U.S.416 From boutique 
European cafés to the tribal lands in Pakistan, the grand strategy inadvertently afforded America 
to amass more opponents than it had started with. These three principal criticisms help explain 
the limitations and inadequacies of the U.S. grand strategy from October 2001 to October 2008 
in relation to Afghanistan.  
 
The Intervention in Afghanistan – Implications for Strategic Analysis 
 
   The methodology of a strategic critique provides a useful analytical tool for commentators to 
assess the effects of implemented policy in its entirety. In most cases this type of research will 
reveal a framework of strategic ‘lessons’ that are applicable in one or another case. Significantly, 
these lessons may reveal trends about individual countries, particular types of conflicts, 
population groups and so on. As a result of this, the knowledge gained from strategic critiques 
plays an important role in informing the policies and strategies of tomorrow. Not only do 
strategic critiques identify the key issues with the strategy in question, but they can also reveal 
important information about the practice of strategic approaches in general. The case of 
Afghanistan has significant contributions in this regard.  
   Most obviously, the example of Afghanistan reveals the significance of the ‘means’ and ‘ends’ 
dynamic in strategic design. In the introduction to this dissertation, the definition of strategy is 
described as the “the way in which the available means will be employed to achieve the ends of policy”.417 
Between October 2001 and October 2008, the intervention in Afghanistan demonstrates that if a 
strategy fails to meet the criteria of this very basic definition, the strategy is unlikely to yield 
significant success.  
   From a grand strategic perspective, the strategy that emerged in the aftermath of 9/11 was the 
most radical and proactive expression of U.S. foreign policy in 50 years.418 Yet for all the 
resources that were committed to the ‘War on Terror’, significant components of the strategy 
were misdirected from the threat that was actually faced. Although terrorism and insurgency was 
nothing new to Washington, there appeared an uncomfortable unwillingness to combat security 
threats outside the realms of traditional Cold War paradigms. For these reasons, the West’s 
military ‘means’ was overwhelmingly shaped by the traditional assumption that security is 
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maintained through deterrence by way of overwhelming conventional superiority. Yet in a war 
against terrorists there is rarely an observable strategic enemy to meet in the field. Therefore the 
operational utility of these forces was seriously flawed. As far as the ‘means’/’ends’ dynamic is 
concerned the grand strategy demonstrated the calamity of using inappropriate and misdirected 
‘means’ towards unachievable ‘ends’.  
   From an operational perspective, the failings of the ‘means’/’ends’ component were more 
rudimentary. The strategic shift away from regime removal and towards rounding up al Qaeda 
and latterly the task of nation-building were, by the objectives they required, far more complex 
processes. Yet paradoxically, while the objectives became unconventional and more ambitious, 
the strategy never committed one or other resources and attention to match this development. 
This was an elementary error of strategic design where the ‘ends’ were rapidly multiplying whilst 
the ‘means’ were reducing. It is for this reason that the blueprint of Afghanistan will serve as an 
unforgettable example of what can go wrong when a ‘strategy’ neglects its most basic constituent 
parts. 
   The case study of the intervention in Afghanistan also provides some useful insight into how 
the conceptual boundaries of strategic analysis have broadened from traditional approaches. For 
Clausewitz, “The aim of war in conception must always be the overthrow of the enemy”.419 Yet when stripped 
of the rhetoric of politicians, the intervention in Afghanistan is one example of how the art of 
stratagem can no longer assume a clear end state. Today’s strategic outcomes are frequently more 
politically and culturally defined than they are militarily. Consequently, the objectives in modern 
strategic approaches are better understood as the pursuit of a particular conceptual space from 
which an acceptable political outcome may be achieved.420 Even when a condition for this 
conceptual space has been met, it may take even more endeavour to maintain that condition. For 
this reason a successful ‘strategic outcome’ for the US and her allies in the modern world is 
unlikely to be clarified by clear strategic ‘ends’ such as ‘victory and conquest’ but by ambiguous 
outcomes that are broadly shaped towards the preservation of the West’s hegemony and the 
status quo. 
   Alongside greater ambiguity of objectives, the intervention reveals how the ‘means’ employed 
in a strategy are now similarly less definitive in their effect. For all the tactical victories such as 
building schools, running elections and successfully vanquishing enemy forces from the field, 
ultimately there is still no guarantee that the tactical level of activity will enable operational or 
grand strategic success. Conversely, whereas insurgents and terrorists rarely experience tactical 
victories, their strategy of piecemeal provocation has proven to endure the test of time. 
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Furthermore, to argue that success could have been achieved in Afghanistan solely by means of 
addressing the issues outlined in the strategic critique would be a very bold claim indeed. The 
complex strategic environment of Afghanistan reveals that the available ‘means’ at the time might 
not have existed to ensure the desired ‘ends’. As a result, a strategy for a strategy’s sake, even in 
perfect design, may not be the dependent variable in guaranteeing policy outcomes.  
   The question for strategists will be how to adjust to these developments within the context of 
security threats in the modern world. This in itself is an unnerving task. Yet it is further 
complicated by the domestic context in which modern strategies are concocted. When a foreign 
policy issue may require intervention, Western societies have a tendency to demand immediate, 
cost effective and definitive solutions. Indeed the structure of Western military resources, shaped 
and moulded to achieve rapid and decisive victories, reflects this requirement.421  
   However, the intervention of Afghanistan reveals how this characteristic of the West’s 
approach to security has been operating in a vacuum that is divorced from the reality of the 
security threats it predominantly faces. Unfortunately for strategists, the intervention in 
Afghanistan demonstrates that in the case of asymmetric warfare, rarely is an outcome so 
straightforward. From the Balkans to Iraq, intra-state conflicts dominate the narrative and have 
an intractable timeless character which cannot always be resolved by the ‘quick fix’ solutions 
demanded by Western publics. As the casualties mount and the costs increase, the consequences 
of a military intervention can overstep the boundaries of what civil society will tolerate. Once this 
reaches a level of political unacceptability, a withdrawal in some form is inevitable. This prevalent 
factor implies that the West might be lacking in the resolve to guarantee successful objectives in 
low intensity but enduring conflicts. As a consequence of this dynamic, ‘staying power’ capacity 
has become the most recent of the crucial considerations for today’s strategists.  
   As Afghanistan nears the end of its third strategic phase, these broader considerations relating 
to strategic approaches are just as important as the ‘lessons learnt’ from strategic critiques of the 
intervention. Consequently the ‘enduring nightmare’ of the intervention in Afghanistan will have 
lasting implications for strategists. The U.S. and her allies have been subjected to a healthy dose 
of humility. Hubris, naïveté and neglect are the most damning indictments on any strategy but 
unfortunately, over the period covered by this dissertation, they are also the most evident 
strategic deductions. For reasons that are related to the chosen strategy, and for reasons that are 
extraneous, from October 2001 to October 2008, Afghanistan failed to emerge from the 
intensive care unit. With all the wealth and conventional military superiority of the U.S. and her 
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allies, the intervention will serve as an important case study of the West’s inability to apply a 
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